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Cert to CA 7
(Fairchild, Swygert,
and Bauer)

v.
TWA, INC., ET AL.
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Federal/Ci vi 1
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Timely

No. 78-1549
TWA, INC., ET AL. o
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Same

v.
ZIPES, ET

AL.~
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. Federal/Ci vi 1
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Timely

- 2 No. 80-951
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION
OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS

Same

v.
TWA, INC., ET AL.

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Whether the DC erred in approving a

~ttleme~ t

agreement.
--7

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Resp, Ann B. Zipes,

individually and on behalf of a class, initiated this litigation
in 1970 challenging the practice of resp TWA of terminating
female flight attendants who became mothers.

The DC entered a

summary judgment in favor of all the class members.
The CA upheld the summary judgment but found that

-- --....._____ ------- - - --- --·--

approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictionally

(

-

-

--.......__

-- --

barred for failure of those plaintiffs to have filed timely
-....

charges of discrimination with the EEOC within 90 days after the

------

--......___

-

.........__

--.......___---

·------remanded to the

occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

.....___

-- -

order was vacated and the action
proceedings.

~

The DC 's

DC for further

The mandate of the CA, however, was stayed when

both the plaintiff's class and TWA filed petitions for certiorari
with this Court.

On June 4, 1979, this Court granted a motion to

defer consideration of the cert petitions pending completion of
se tt lemen t negotiations in the DC.
The resps arrived at a settlement, for which approval by the
DC was required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23{e).

Under the

terms of the settlement, women who' were discharged or had
.- -;

children within 90 days of the filing of the EEOC charge or who

- 3 -

c-·

were reinstated in a ground position and served in that position
within the 90 day period, are to receive a pro-rata share of $1.5
million.

("Subclass A")

Another $1.5 million is to be divided

among the larger class who were discharged earlier -- the class

j

whose claims the CA had found to be jurisdictionally barred.
("Subclass B")

All the women affected would be offered

reemployment and full company seniority, subject to certain
conditions.
Petr, the union representing current TWA personnel, was
allowed to intervene to challenge the proposed settlement.

The

proposed settlement was estimated to create applications for
t--

~

'----

reemployment from 33 members of subclass A and .,.......___
172 members of
~

subclass B.
('----'

TWA employs in excess of 6,000 flight attendants.

Evidence was presented to indicate that in a single year the
airline hires between 400 and 800 new flight attendants.

I

The DC overruled petr's objection to its jurisdiction to
consider the proposed settlement and approved the settlement.
Regarding jurisdiction, the DC reasoned that it was not bound by
theCA's earlier ruling regarding the jurisdictional bar to the
claims of subclass B because of the absence of the issuance of
the mandate.
and

adequ~

The settlement was approved as "fair, reasonable
for the parties and the subclasses."

TheCA affirmed.

TheCA rejected petr's contention that the

DC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over t he claims of subclass
B as a result of the CA's earlier decision.

Petr had argued that

once theCA had found subject matter jurisdiction to be lacking
as to subclass B the DC could not approve a settlement granting

'· • '"l\';"'""'

••

- 4 any benefit to the members of subclass B.

(

The CA noted that

settlements are entered into because of the very uncertainties of
the outcome in litigation as well as the avoidance of wasteful
litigation and expense.

The issue of the jurisdiction of the DC

with regard to subclass B had not been finally determined because
a challenge to the CA's earlier decision is still pending before
the

s.

Ct.

The compromise reflects the parties perception that

the ultimate resolution of this issue could not be predicted with
certainty because prior case law leaves the law in this matter
open to question and the S. Ct. has not decided whether the time
requirements for filing charges with the EEOC defines the court's
subject matter jurisdiction (as the CA held) or should be treated
as a statute of limitation in which case the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel apply.
'-'

The uncertainty of the outcome of this

issue was a major factor leading the parties to reach this
settlement and the settlement was not an attempt to confer
subject matter jurisdiction by consent.
TheCA also rejected petr's contention that the DC should be
reversed on the basis of McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F.2d
276 (5th Cir. 1978)

(en bane).

McArthur involved the DC 's

approval of a settlement between Southern Airways and female
flight attendants who alleged similar violations of Title VII.
After the settlement approval, this Court decided United Airlines
v. Evans which held that a discriminatory act which has not been
made the basis for a timely charge has no legal consequences and
does not create a continuing violation unless a present violation
exists.

Because no plaintiff in McArthur had made a timely

-

·..

, __....

- 5 -

c·

filing with the EEOC nor were there continuing violations under
the Evans standard, the CAS reversed the settlemen·t approval on
the ground that the DC had lacked jurisdiction over the action
and therefore had no authority to approve the settlement.
the situation is different.

Here,

In McArthur, there was found to be

no subject matter jurisdiction at the time of approval of the
settlement but the DC here clearly had jurisd iction over the
claims of 8% of the plaintiff's class.
declined to adopt the McArthur rule.

In any event, theCA
The principles favoring

settlement of class action law suits remain t he same regardless
of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction
of the court.

Where the jurisdictional question is not settled

with finality, parties should not be forced t o litigate the issue

(

of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is
otherwise appropriate for DC approval.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr repeats its argument in this Court.

Petr also argues that theCA's determination that McCarthur was
distinguishable because the DC here had jurisdiction of the
claims of subclass A conflicts with this Court's decision in
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969} and Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973}.

Those cases firmly establish

that in any class action the court must have jurisdiction of the
claim of each plaintiff.

Additionally, the jurisdictional issues

is clearly controlled by United Airlines v. Evans.
Petr also argues that the settlement wa s unreasonable and

.

unfair.

7

1

The burden for a grant of seniority falls squarely upon

)

innocent employees who never discriminated Rgainst anyone.

Here,

.....

'.

- 6 -

(

the burden falls disproportionately upon innoc ent incumbent
employees who are asked to move over in favor of individuals who
cannot prove violations of Title VII entitling them to any
rightful place to which they should be allowe d to return.

In

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
this Court said that granting seniority is an appropriate remedy
absent unusual adverse impat upon incumbent employees not
generally found in Title VII cases.
present in this case.

Such adverse impact is

First, More than 400 flight attendants are

presently and have been since at least Octob e r 1979, on lay-off.
If and when positions reopen, these laid-off flight attendants
will pit their seniority against that of returning plaintiffs
(with a minimum of 10 years seniority) for such vacancies.
( '

Second, many active employees likely will be forced to relocate
to another city because of their loss of seniority.

Third, the

decision below grants seniority at the expense of other classes
of employees themselves victims of TWA's pa s t discriminatory
practices.

Such groups include: (1) black f light attendants;
(3) females denied employment by TWA

(2) male flight attendants;
because of motherhood;

and (4) females who were forced to forego

motherhood as a condition of continued employment.
The resps have filed separate responses.

They argue that

where the issue of jurisdiction poses a bonafide question of law,
a OC has the power to implement a settlement in which both sides
compromise on that question.

The CA 5 did not address this issue

in McArthur and there is no conflict on this question between the
circuits.

Because the mandate of the CA wa s stayed, its opinion

.

~

.

- 7 (

regarding jurisdiction did not present the DC from effectuating
the parties compromised settlement.

Petr never had standing to

prevent TWA from compromising on the legal question of
jurisdiction.

Petr's limited interest in the seniority question

was fully and properly adjudicated.

Moreover, the grant of

seniority was clearly within the discretion of the DC.

Petr

failed to show any unusual adverse impact.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Given that the mandate of the initial CA

opinion was stayed, it would seem that a DC

shoQ~ have

the

authority to approve a settlement between the parties as long as
contested issues remained.

Arguably, this proposition should not

change even though it is) very probable that part of the class
which was to receive , relief would have been dismissed out of the

( :'\

case if the litigation had been allowed to

-------

p~oceed

to its normal

end. There is, however, a substantial unfairness about grantingat
employees whoese claims are jurisdictionally barred seniority

(

the expense of the present employees.
There is a conflict between the CA's decision and the
decision of the CAS in McArthur but it is not as direct as petr
makes it out to be.

The resps point out that the plaintiffs in

McArthur admitted that they had not complied with the Title VII
time requirements.

Their brief even conceded that they would

not have brought the action if this Court's decision in Evans had
been decided before they had filed it.

Her e , compliance with the

Title VII time limit remained in dispute at the time of the
settlement and was one of the important issues that gave rise to
the compromise.

~

{

- 8 -

It should be noted that both resps have filed stipulations
with the Clerk stating that if the present petition for
certiorari is denied they will stipulate to the dismissal of the
cross petitions in their pending cases in No. 78-1545 and No. 781549.
I recommend a denial of this petition as well as a denial in
the pending cases.

1/25/81
JBP

There are two responses.

Colson
(~rt~)
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No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. &
No. 80-951, Indepe ndent Federation of Flight Att e ndants v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., et al.

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider
whether the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and,
if so, whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally
barred claims.
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging
TWA's policy of terminating female flight flight attendants who
became mothers.

The District Court granted summary judgment in

favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals upheld the
summary judgment on the merits but concluded that approxima tely
92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictional ly barred
because those plaintiffs had not filed timely ch a rges of
discrimination with the EEOC.l

The Court of Appuals' mandate was

!Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeliness
defense by failing to plead it affirmatively in its answer.
Ther e fore, the court consider ed wh e ther th e time period for
f iling charges with the EEOC "i s in the na ture of a statute of
limitations, in which cas e the doctrine of waiver and estoppel

\

stayed pending petition for certiorari here.2

On June 4, 1979,

we granted the parties' motion to defer consideration of the
petitions for writ of certiorari pending completion of settlement
proceedings.

Meanwhile, the parties negotiated a settlement and

sought the approval of the District Court, as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).
relief to those plaintiffs

.
whose

The settlement provided monetary
claims would not be

jurisdictionally barred under the Court of Appeals' decision
("Subclass A") and to those plaintiffs whose
jurisdictionally barred ("Subclass B").

cla~ms

would be

All class members were

offered reemployment and full company seniority, subject to
certain conditions.

The International Federation of Flight

Attendants ("IFFA") intervened, representing TWA flight
attendants who might be affected by the settlement agreement.

would apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in which
In
re
case
the employer could raise
it at
any
time."
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d
1142 (CA7 1978).
The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC
was contained in 42 u.s.c. §2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered
42 u.s.c. §2000e-5 (e) (1972).
2Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No.
78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., and TWA
filed a conditional cross-petition, No. 78-1549, Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al.
Plaintiffs argued that the
t1mely filing of a charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
a Title VII suit.
They noted that the Court had granted
certiorari in Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 439 U.S. 99 (1977) to
resolve the parallel issue under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 u.s.c. §621 et ~., and had affirmed
the judgment below by an equally divided court.
The Court of
Appeals had held that the ADEA's requirement that a timely notice
of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is subject
to tolling and estoppel.
Dartt v. Shell Oil Cc ., 539 F.2d 1256
(CAlO 1976).

The District Court approved the settlement and rejected IFFA's
contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound by the Court
of Appeals' decision, since the court's mandate had been stayed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that "the principles
favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same
regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the
jurisdiction of the court over the action" and noting that the
disputed issue of whether Subclass B's claims weLe
jurisdictionally barred had not been "settled with finality."3
The court declined to follow McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569
F·. 2d 276 {CAS 1978)

{en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement
in a Title VII class action, holding that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge
of discrimination with the EEOC.

IFFA now seeks review of the

Court of Appeals decision, arguing that the District Court erred
in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally barred claims.4
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held
that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it is
difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with the
rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 {h) {3):

3Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass' n , Local 550, et
al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169
(CA7 1980).
4No. 80-951, Independent Federation
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al.

I'J'.,,
I'

of

Flight At tend ants

"Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action."

Furthermore, the Court of

Appeals' ruling that a District Court may approve the settlement
of a jurisdictional issue conflicts with its own precedentS and
with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in
McArthur, supra.
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether
subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC.

The Courts of

Appeals have been struggling with this question,6 and we have
referred to the filing requirement both as a "jurisdictional
prerequisite"? and as serving the purpose of a statute of

Ssee Patterson v. Stovall, S28 F.2d 108, 112, n. S (CA7
1976) ("[T]he District Court would have [had] no authority to
approve the settlement had it lacked jurisdiction").
6compare, Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Corp., S98 F.2d
829, 831 (CA3 1979)
(not a jurisdictional prereq,uisi te) and
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., _
U.S. App. D.C. _ , S67
F.2d 429, 47S (1976) (same), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1086 (1978),
with In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines
Cases, S82 F.2d 1142 (CA7 1978) (jurisdictional prerequisite).
See Daughtrt v. King's Dept. Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906 (CAl
1979); Srnit
v. American President Lines, Ltd., S71 F.2d 102,
108-109 (CA2 19 7 8) (expressly reserving the issue of whether the
time limit for filing may be extended by equitable tolling or
whether it is "strictly jurisdictional"). See also Chappell v.
Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 129S (CAS 1979) (timely filing is
a "Jurisdictional prerequisite," but is not juri s dictional in the
same sense as is the amount in controversy requirement in
diversity actions).
?see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 41S u.s. 36, 47
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 u.s. 792, 798
(1973).

limitations.8
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari
in No. 78-1545 and No. 80-951.

8rn Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC~, 432 U.S. 355,
372 (1977), the Court referred --to the filing period as serving
the purposes of a statute of limitations. In El ectrical workers
y. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 u.s. 229 (1976), the Court referred
to the filing period a s a "limitation s period", 429 u.s. at 238'--- 244, and to the timely filing requireme nt as ;;_ "jurisdictional
prerequisite." 429 u.s., at 240.
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ANNE B. ZIPES ET AL. V. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES,
INC., and INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS v. TRANS WORLD
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 78-1545 and 80-951.

Decided March - , 1981

JusTICE WHITE. dissenting.
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider whether
the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and. if so,
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District
Court's approval of the settlemeu t of jurisdictionally barred
claims.
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging
TWA's policy of terminating female flight attendants who
became mothers. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals
upheld the summary judgment on the merits but concluded
that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictionally barred because those plaintiffs had not filed timely
charges of discrimination with the EEOC. 1 The Court of
Appeals' mandate was stayed pending petition for certiorari
1 Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeline:ss defense by flt.iling to plead it affirmatively in its answer. Therefore, the court considered
whether the time period for filing charges with the EEOC "is in the nature
of a statute of limitations, in which case the doctrine of waiver and
estoppel would apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in which
ease the employer could raise it at. any time." In re Consolidated Pretrial
Pmceedings in the Ai·rline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142 (CA7 1978).
The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC was contained in 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered 42 U.S. C.
§ 2000e-5 (e) (1972).

I

•

ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

here.z On June 4, 1979, we granted the parties' motion to
defer consideration of the petitions for writ of certiorari
pending completion of settlement proceedings. Meanwhile,
the parties negotiated a settlement and sought the approval
of the District Court, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 (e). The settlement provided monetary relief
to those plaintiffs whose claims would not be jurisdictionally
barred under the Court of Appeals' decision ("Subclass A")
and to those plaintiffs whose claims would be jurisdictionally
barred ("Subclass B"). All class members were offered reemployment and full company seniority, subject to certain
eonditions. The International Federation of Flight Attendants ("IFFA") intervened, representing TWA flight attendants who might be affected by the settlement agreement.
The District Court approved the settlement and rejected
IFF A's contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound
by the Court of Appeals' decision, since the court's mandate
had been stayed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning
that "the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed
legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the
action" and noting that the disputed issue of whether Subclass B's claims were jurisdictionally barred had not been
"settled with finality."~ The court declined to follow
Plaintiff:; filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al.
v. 'l'rans World Airlines, Inc. , and TWA filed a conditional cross-petition,
No . 78-1549, Trans World Airlines, hu;. v. Zipes, et al. Plaintiffs argued
that the timely filing of a charge i:s not a jurilldict.ional prerequi:site to a
Title VII suit. They note that the CoUii had granted certiorari in Shell
Oil Co . v. Dartt, 43l U. S. 99 ( 1977) to resolve the parallel issue under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621
1t seq., and had affirmed the judgment below by an equally divided court.
The Court of Appeab had held that. the ADEA's requirement that a
timely notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is subject to tolling and estoppel. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. 2d 1256
(CAlO 1976).
• Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn., Local 550, et al. v. Tr-an'8
'World Airlines, Inc ., et al., 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980).
1

'
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McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978)
(en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir~
cuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a
Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. IFF A now seeks review of
the Court of Appeals decision, arguing that the District
Court erred in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally
barred claims!
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
held that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it
is difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with
the rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h)
(3): "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals' ruling that a District Court may ap- ..-e._
prove the settlement of a jurisdicti01f issue conflicts with its
own precedent 5 and with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's decision in McArthur, supra.
·
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether
~;ubject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. The
Courts of Appeals have been struggling with this question, 6
4 No . 80-851, Independent Pedemtion of Plight Attendants v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. , et al.
1 See Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112, n. 5 (CA7 1976) ("[T]he
Di~trict Court would have !'IJadJ no authority to approve the settlement
had it lacked jurisdiction") .
• Compare, Hart v. J . '1'. Baker Chemical Corp ., 598 F . 2d 829, 831
(CA3 1979) (not a jurisdiction prerequi::;ite) and Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Iuc ., - U. S. App . D . C. - , 567 F . 2d 429, 475 (1976) (same),
eert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978), with In reConsolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142 (CA7 1978) (jurisdictio-nal
prerequisite) . See Daughtry v. King's Dept . Stor·es, Inc., 608 F. 2d 906
(CAl 1979); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102,
108-109 (CA2 1978) (expres::;ly reserving the is:,ue of whether the time
limit for filing may be e~tencled by equitable tolling or whether it is
"strictly jurisdictional") . See also Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co.,.

-ZJPES
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THANS WOHLJ> AlHLl~f<~\ Il'\C.

aud we havf> referred to the filing rt>quirement both as a
"jurisdictional prerequisite"' and as serving the purpose of
a statute of limitations."
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of Cf>rtiorari in No.
78-1545 and No. R0- 951.

601 F. :!d 1:295 (C'A5 1979) (tinwl~· filin~ i,.: a "juri~uictiunal pr("rP(jui~ite,"
but i:; nut juri~dictiunal in the ~a me :>t:>n,.:e a~ i::; t lw amount in euntruven:,~·
requirrml'nt in din·r~ ity actiunH).
7 SeP Ale.cander " · Oard'ller-Denver C'o., 415 ( I S. 3(\, -!7 (HJ74);
McDonnell Doug/a.~ ('orp . v. Ureen . ~11 11. H. i!~:!, iH>- (Hii;~) .
8 In Or·ridental Life fr1suraJH'P Co. \'. El<JOC' , ~;{:! ('. S. :355, :37:! (1H77),
the Court rPfl·rrPu to rhe filinl! period a>< "erving t hr purpo,.:e,.: uf H statute
of limitations. In El~:ctrical Worker8 ' . RubbinN & 111uer8, Inc .. -!:W 0. S.
229 (1976), tlw Court referred to tlw filin~ period as a "limitation,; period," -!29 11. S., at :!;{K-:!4-!, and to tlw tinu-ly filiug re<.juireruent u.s a
"jurisdil'tiunal prf' requi><ite.'' ~29 U. S., at 2-!0.
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ANNE B. ZIPES ET AL. v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES,
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Decided March -, 1981

JusTICE WHITE, with whom JusTICE PowELL and JusTICE '
REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider whether
the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and, if so,
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District
Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally barred
claims.
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging
TWA's policy of terminating female flight attendants who
became mothers. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals
upheld the summary judgment on the merits but concluded
that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictionally barred because those plaintiffs had not filed timely
charges of discrimination with the EEOC. 1 The Court of
Appeals' mandate was stayed pending petition for certiorari
Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeliness defense by failing to plead it aflirmatively in its answer. Therefore, the court considered
whether the time period for filing charges with the EEOC "is in the nature
of a statute of limitations in which case the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel would- apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in which
case the employer could raise it at any time." In re C011solidated Pretrial
P1'oceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1151 (CA7 1978).
The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC was contained in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-5 (e) (1972).
1
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here .~

On June 4, 1979, we granted the parties' motion to
defer consideration of the petitions for writ of certiorari
pending completion of settlement proceedings. Meanwhile,
the parties negotiated a settlement and sought the approval
of the District Court, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 (e). The settlement provided monetary relief
to those plaintiffs whose claims would not be jurisdictionally
barred under the Court of Appeals' decision ("Subclass A")
and to those plaintiffs whose claims would be jurisdictionally
barred ("Subclass B"). All class members were offered reemployment and full company seniority, subject to certai11
conditions. The International Federation of Flight Attendants ("IFF A") intervened, representing 1'WA flight attendants who might be affected by the settlement agreement.
The District Court approved the ~ettlement and rejected
IFF A's contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound
by the Court of Appeals' decisioh, since the court's mandate
had been stayed. The Court of Apqeals affirmed, reasoning
that "the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed
legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the
action" and noting that the disputed issue of whether Subclass B's claims were jurisdictionally barred had not been
"settled with finality." 3 The court declined to follow
2 Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al.
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , and TWA filed a conditional cross-petition,
No . 78-1549, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al. Plaintiffs argued
that the timely filing of a charge i~ not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
Title VII suit. They noted that the Court had granted certiorari in Shell
Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U. S. 99 (1977) to re.solvE> the parallel issue undE>r
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621
et seq., and had affirmed the judgment below by an equally divided court.
The Court of Appeals ha.cl held that the ADEA's requirement that a
timely notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is subject to tolling and estpppel. Dartt v. She~ Oil Co ., 539 F. 2d 1256
(CAIO 1976).
3 Air Line Stewards and Stewardessel! Assn., Local 550, et ul. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. , et al., 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980).
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3

McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978)
(en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a
Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. IFF A now seeks review of
the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the ·District
Court erred in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally
barred claims. •
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
held that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it
is difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with
the rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h)
(3): "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals' ruling that a District Court may approve the settlement of a jurisdictional iEsue conflicts with its
own precedent~ and with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's decision in McArthur, supra.
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether
subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. The
Courts of Appeals have been struggling with this question, 6
4 No 80-951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. 'l'rans
World Airlines, Inc. , et al.
5 See Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112, n. 5 (CA7 1976) ("[T]he
District Court would have [had] no authority to approve the ~ettlement
had it lacked jurisdiction") .
6
Compare, Hart v. J. T . Baker Chemical Corp, 598 F. 2d 829, 831
(CA3 1979) (not a jurisdictional prerequisite) and Lrrffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc ., U. S. App. D . C. - , - , 567 F. 2d 429, 475 (1967)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978), with In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases. 582 F. 2d 1142, 1151 (CA7 1978)
(jurisdictional prerequisite). See Daughtry v. King's De11t . Stores, Inc.,
608 F. 2d 906, 909 (CAl 1979); Smith v. Am ~rican President Lines, Ltd.,
571 F. 2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978) (expreo~ly reserving the issue of
whether the time limit for filing may be extended by equitable tolling or
wheth~r it is "strictly juri~dictional") . See tl l~o Chappell v. Emco M a;h.
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and we have referred to the filing requirement both as a
"jurisdictional prerequisite" 7 and as serving the purpose of
a statute of limitations. 8
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari in No.
78-1545 and No. 80-951.

Works Co., 601 F. 2d 1295, 1298 (CA5 1979) (timely filing is a "jur:Sdictional prerequisite," but is not jurisdictional in the same sense as is the
amount in controversy requirement in diversity action;;).
7 See Alexande1· v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47 (1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973).
8 In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977),
the Court referred to the filing period as serving the purposes of a statute
of limitations. In Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 42.g U. S.
229 ( 1976), the Court referred to the filing period as a "limitations period," 429 U. S., at 23&-244, and to the timely filing requirement as a
"jurisdictional prerequisite." 429 U. S., at 240.
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shall meanwhile circulate a memorandum, and I have
suggested to the Legal Officer

that he might at
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CH AMBE RS OF

J USTICE B Y RON R . WHIT E

May 11, 1981

Memorandum to the Conference
Re: Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, et al.
TWA's Motion to Limit the Grant in No. 80-951
and to Dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as Moot

I. SUMMARY
We granted certiorari in No. 80-951 on March 9, 1981.
primary

issues

presented

by

petitioner

are

(1)

whether

The
the

timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and, if so,
whether

the

Court's

approval of

claims.

Petitioner

Attendants

Court

of Appeals erred

in

the

settlement of

is

the

affirming

(2)

the District

jurisdictionally barred

Independent

Federation

of

Flight

(IFFA), representing TWA flight attendants who would

be adversely affected by the grant of competitive seniority to
plaintiffs who are re-employed as flight attendants pursuant to
the settlement agreement.

Respondents are TWA and the plaintiff

-2-

IFFA challenges two separate orders entered by the DC.

In

one order the DC approved the settlement agreement; in the other
it awarded competitive seniority to reinstated plaintiffs.
moves

the

Court

to

limit

its

review

to

the

order

TWA

awarding

competitive seniority.
When we granted certiorari in No.
certioriari

in

two

other

petitions

80-951, we also granted
filed

earlier

in

this

litigation, which we had held pending resolution of settlement
proceedings.

Those petitions seek review of a prior CA decision

in this case.
timely

filing

prerequisite.

In No. 78-1545, plaintiff class contends that the
of
In

EEOC
No.

charges

78-1549,

TWA

is

not

a

contends

jurisdictional
(a)

that

the CA

erred in affirming summary judgment 'for plaintiffs on the issue
of

liability,

plaintiffs

(b)

that TWA

prospective

should

relief,

and

only

be

required

(c)

that

the

CA

to grant
erred

in

defining the subclass of plaintiffs who had filed timely charges
with the EEOC.
TWA asks the Court to dismiss No. 78-1545 and No. 78-1549
as moot

if the Court limits its review to

the order

awarding

competitive seniority.
The

plaintiff

motion; or

class

asks

the

Court

to

(a)

grant

TWA's

(b) order the parties to stipulate to the dismissal

-3-

of Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549; or (c) dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 781549 as moot.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs

are

women

who

lost

their

jobs

as TWA

flight

attendants because of TWA's policy (prior to 1970) of requiring
flight attendants who became mothers to resign or accept ground
duty

positions.!

Plaintiffs

filed

a

Title VII

class

action

challenging this policy.
A.
summary

DC's

1976

Orders:

judgment on the

In

October

1976,

the

DC

granted

issue of liability and rejected TWA's

contention that certain members of the plaintiff class had not
filed timely charges with the EEOC.
filing

requirement

is

The DC held that the timely

jurisdictional.

violation of plaintiffs'

However,

a

continuing

rights existed until TWA changed its

policy and permitted the rehiring of flight attendants who had
become mothers.

Thus, all plaintiffs had met the timely filing

requirement.
B. CA's 1978 Decision: The CA affirmed the DC's ruling on

lTwA did not impose similar restrictions on
attendants who became fathers. See note 17, infra •

.•

male

cabin

-4-

liability

and
It

issue.

vacated
held

jurisdictional

and

DC's

that

the

that

the

(labelled

"Subclass B")

concluded

that

all

the

timely
claims

were

members

ruling

on

the

filing
of

timely

requirement

certain

class

jurisdictionally barred.
of

the

filing

plaintiff

class

is

members
The CA
who

were

permanently terminated during the 90 days preceding the filing
of EEOC charges and all members who were reinstated in ground
duty positions after their maternity leave and continued their
employment into the 90-day period preceding the filing of EEOC
charges

had

met

plaintiffs were
the

reinstated

the

behalf

Cert
of

filing

requirement.

labelled "Subclass A.")
employees

violation of Title VII.
C.

timely

Petition

Subclass

B)

had

been

(These

The CA reasoned that

subjected

to

a

continuing

582 F.2d at 1149-1150.2
No.

78-1545:

filed

a

cert

seeking review of the CA's decision.

The

plaintiff

petition,

No.

class

(on

78-1545,

The only issue presented

in that petition is whether the timely filing requirement is a
jurisdictional prerequisite and therefore is not subject to the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel.3

2see

note

17,

infra.

3The CA had rejected plaintiffs' contentions that TWA
waived the timely filing defense by failing to raise it in the
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D.

Conditional

conditional

Cross-petition No.

cross-petition,

No.

TWA

78-1549:

78-1549,

arguing:

judgment on the issue of liability was improper;
was a Title VII violation,

filed

(a)
(b)

a

summary
if there

the remedies should be prospective

only; and (c) the CA erred in defining Subclass A.4
E.
Court

Motion

to Defer Consideration:

to defer

consideration of

The parties asked the

these

completion of settlement proceedings.

cert petitions pending
Their motion was granted

on June 4, 1979.
F.

Settlement

negotiated

a

Agreement:

settlement

class members

TWA

and

the

plaintiff

that provided monetary

relief

class
to all

(Subclass A and Subclass B) 5 and required TWA to

re-employ as flight attendants all class members who were ready,
willing

and

qualified

to

p~rform

the

job.

The

settlement

agreement also provided:

answer to the complaint and that TWA was estopped from relying
on this defense because TWA raised the issue so late in the
proceedings.
4see

note

17,

infra.

5Members of Subclass A were awarded substantially more
monetary
compensation
than members
of
Subclass B.
The
settlement agreement adopted the CA's definition of Subclasses A
and B.
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"All re-employed class members shall have, be
credited with and enjoy the amount of seniority
and credit for length of service as is provided
in Section V hereof."
Section

V(A)

dealt

with

company

seniority.

Section

V(B)

provided:
"It is agreed that the total amount of seniority
and credit for length of service (both accrued
and retroactive) for the compensation period
will be determined by the Court
in
its
discretion,
pursuant
to the provisions of
Section
706(g),
and
all
other
applicable
provisions of law, without contest or objection
by TWA. II
The settlement agreement also stated:
"Nothing contained in any other agreement or
writing and no right or obligation which has
arisen or accrued outside of this Settlement
Agreement (including prior, current and future
labor agreements) shall be deemed to modify,
change or diminish the rights and obligations
which arise under this Agreement."
(emphasis
added)
The parties agreed that the settlement would be submitted to the
DC for approval and that "[t] he parties shall jointly file in
the United States Supreme Court a motion and stipulation asking
that the current pending petitions for writs of certiorari be
held

in

dismissed

abeyance

during

immediately after

the

settlement

procedures,

the Final Order Date."

to

be

The term

-7-

"Final Order Date" was defined as "the date on which the order
described in Section X becomes final and no longer subject to
court review."

The order described in Section X was "an order

which

this

approves

Settlement Agreement

and

dismisses

these

cases against TWA."
G. DC's 1979 Orders:
of

the

settlement,

The parties sought the DC's approval

as

required

by

F.R.C.P.

23(e) .6

IFFA

intervened, asserting that the DC lacked jurisdiction over the
claims

of

Subclass

B and

therefore

was

without

authority

to

approve that part of the settlement agreement that allowed for
an award of competitive seniority to members of Subclass B.
DC

held

that

exercising

its

the

CA's

1978

authority

decision

over

those

did

not

portions

of

bar

it

the

The
"from

proposed

settlement agreement pertaining to members of Subclass B."

It

emphasized that the CA had stayed its mandate with respect to
the

jurisdictional

6F.R.C.P.

23(e)

issue

pending

final

provides:

"A class action shall not be
compromised without the approval
and
notice
of
the
proposed
compromise shall be given to all
class in such manner as the court

'-$<, '

disposition

dismissed or
of the court,
dismissal
or
members of the
directs."

of

cert

-8-

petition No. 78-1545.
1. "Order Approving Settlement and Dismissing Actions":
The DC subsequently entered an order approving the settlement
and

agreement

dismissing

the

The

action. 7

DC

retained

jurisdiction (a) to determine the total amount of seniority and
credit for length of service for re-employed class members as
provided in Section V (B)

of the Settlement Agreement;

(b)

to

enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and to adjudicate
any

disputes

over

the

interpretation

of

the

settlement

agreement; and (c) to award costs and attorneys' fees.
2. "Order Awarding Seniority":
entered

a

separate

order,

stating

On the same day, the DC

that

"full restoration of

retroactive seniority will not have an unusual adverse impact
upon currently employed flight attendants in a manner which is
not typical of other Title VI I cases," and ordering that each
re-employed class member be granted full retroactive competitive
seniority.

The DC retained jurisdiction regarding subjects (b)

?The DC
settlement had
had objected
agreement was
and Subclasses

l'"' '

found
that proper notice of the proposed
been given to class members, that no class member
to the settlement, and that the settlement
"fair, reasonable, and adequate for the parties
A and B."
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and (c) above.8
H. CA's 1980 Decision:
the CA affirmed the DC' s

IFFA appealed from both orders, and
approval of the settlement agreement

and its award of retroactive seniority.

The CA rejected IFFA's

contention that, with respect to the claims of Subclass B, the
parties had conferred subject matter
consent.
action

"We think the principles favoring settlement of class
lawsuits

disputed legal

remain

settled

litigate

same

regardless

of

whether

the

jurisdiction of the court

Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is

with

the

the

issues center on the

over the action.
not

jurisdiction on the DC by

finality,

issue
is

of

parties

jurisdiction

settlement

that

otherwise

approval."

630 F.2d, at 1169.

should
if

not

they

appropriate

be

can

for

forced

arrive

district

at

to
a

court

TheCA ruled that the DC had not

abused its discretion in approving the settlement and granting
retraoctive competitive seniority.
I. Cert Petition No.
No.

80-951,

arguing:

80-951:
(1)

The

IFFA filed a cert petition,
DC

lacked

subject

matter

8with respect to each order the DC made a finding,
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b) that "no just reason exists to delay
enforcement of or appeal from this Order."
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jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass B and therefore could
not (a} approve settlement of those claims;
employees

be

(b) order that those

awarded competitive seniority;

or

(c)

order

that

the provisions of the settlement would supersede the collective
bargaining agreement between TWA and IFFA.
make a finding, pursuant to 42

u.s.c.

(2}

§2000e-5(g}, that TWA had

violated Title VII as to Subclass B members.9

942

u.s.c.

§2000e-5(g}

provides

The DC did not

Therefore, the DC

in part:

"If the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
or employees ••• or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate."
(emphasis
added}.
IFFA contends that "as to Subclass B, a violation has
neither been admitted nor proven." Cert Petn, at 19. Although
IFFA suggests that "plaintiffs who settle" have not established
that a Title VII violation occurred, IFFA states that its
argument only applies to Subclass B.
Ibid., n. 15.
IFFA
contends that there clearly was no "finding" with respect to
Subclass B, since the CA held in 1978 that Subclass B's claims
were jurisdictionally barred.
"At the time of settlement, the
only finding in effect as to the claims of Sub-Class B was that
they are barred by the failure to comply with the jurisdictional
time limits." Ibid.
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was not empowered to grant them full retroactive seniority or to
approve

a

settlement

agreement

collective bargaining agreement.

superseding
(3)

the

terms

of

the

An award of competitive

seniority was inappropriate, since it had an unusually adverse
impact on incumbent employees.

III. MOTIONS FILED BY TWA AND THE PLAINTIFF CLASS
A. TWA's Motion:
grant in No.

Rather than asking the Court to limit the

80-951 to particular questions raised in the cert

petition, TWA moves the Court to limit review to the order of
the DC entitled
the

settlement

"Order Awarding Seniority."
agreement,

TWA

and

the

As TWA construes

plaintiff

class

have

agreed that as soon as the separate "Order Approving Settlement"
is no longer
Court

to

1549).

subject to

dismiss

their

judicial review,
cert

Nos.

(Nos.

78-1545

this

and

78-

TWA contends that if the Court limits its review to the

"Order Awarding Seniority,"
in

petitions

they must move

78-1545

dismissa1.10

and

it should then treat the petitions

78-1549

as

moot

and

direct

their

If the grant is not so limited, consideration of

lOTWA points out that when litigation in the federal
courts is settled after a petition for certiorari has been
filed, this Court vacates the CA's judgment and directs that the
case be dismissed as moot.
See, e.g., J. Aron & Co. v.
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those petitions should be deferred.ll
TWA asserts that "review of the seniority order alone will
adequately
flight
"the

protect

attendants whom

issues

could

the

raised

continue

order."

by

interests
the
the

union

of

the

solely

currently

represents"

union against the

to

be

considered

in

According

to

TWA,

cannot

IFFA

review

employed
and

that

settlement order
of

object

the
to

seniority
the

Order

Approving Settlement, since it merely provided that the DC would
decide
and

the

issue of competitive seniority pursuant to §706 (g)

"all other

Court

to

Seniority

limit
so

applicable provisions of
the

that

grant

"[t]he

to

review

parties

to

law."

of
the

the

TWA
Order

litigation

urges

the

Awarding
would

be

permitted to make a valid settlement regardless of the possible
lack of jurisdiction over the claims settled."

TWA Motion, p.

9.
B. The Plaintiff Class's Motion:

Mississippi Shipping Co., 361

u.s.

The plaintiff class does

115 (1959).

ll"The
reasons
for
holding
up consideration of
the
petitions in Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 continue to exist until
this Court issues an order on the union's appeal from the
settlement order in No. 80-951." TWA's Motion, p. 3.
I do not
read this as a motion to defer and do not treat it as such .

.

''
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not object to TWA's motion.
grant TWA's motion, or

Plaintiffs move the Court to

(a)

(b) order TWA and the plaintiff class to

stipulate to the dismissal of Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549, or
dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as moot.

(c)

Plaintiffs argue that

there is no longer a case or controversy between them and TWA,
since they have entered
that

IFFA

does

not

into a settlement.

have

standing

to

They also contend

object

to

the

Order

Approving Settlement, for IFFA merely objects to that order as
"the

underpinning

seniority."

to

the

Plaintiffs'

order

which

Response,

p.

granted
3.

competitive

The

settlement

agreement merely recognized that competitive seniority would be
determined by the DC in an adversarial proceeding in which IFFA
could participate.

Therefore, the Order Approving Settlement is

no

to

longer

obligated
dismissal
Court

subject
by
of

the
the

to order

judicial

settlement
pending

review

and

agreement

cert petitions.

TWA

to

is

currently

stipulate

to

the

Plaintiffs

ask

the

them and TWA to stipulate to the dismissal of

Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549.
Plaintiffs assert that even if this Court were to hold that
the DC lacked jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass B,
settlement

agreement would

still

be

binding,

"for

the

the

simple

reason that the pivotal issue of whether the timely filing of an

.
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EEOC

charge

affects

compromised."

c.

jurisdiction

of

Nos.

in

seniority
affected
Order

the

to

and

case

the

IFFA takes no position on the proper

78-1545

limitation of the grant
interest

settled

been

Plaintiffs' Response, p. 4.

IFFA's Response:

disposition

has

and

in No.

is

78-1549

80-951.

the grant of

plaintiff

class.

but

objects

IFFA agrees

to

that

a
its

retroactive competitive

However,

that

interest

is

by the Order Approving Settlement as well as by the

Awarding

Seniority.

IFFA

continues

to

object

to

following provisions in the Order Approving Settlement:
provision

that

the

agreement

future labor agreements;

(b)

supersedes

prior,

the

(a) the

current

and

the provising stating that the DC

will retain jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the settlement
agreement; and (c) the provision stating that the DC will decide
the issue of competitive seniority [with respect to Subclass B].
IFFA asserts that although TWA and plaintiffs were free to
enter

into

an out-of-court

settlement,

they could

not

confer

jurisdiction on the DC to approve their agreement to compromise
the jurisdictional dispute.
D. The Plaintiff Class's Supplemental Response:

Plaintiffs

disagree with TWA's position that the Order Approving Settlement
will only be final if the Court grants TWA's motion.

IFFA may

'·'

.

/\ ,.

,

.

..
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not obtain review of the Order Approving Settlement, since the
provisions in the settlement agreement that IFFA objects to are
meaningless.

"Each provision recites a matter that by operation

of law would exist even in the absence of the provision."
would

not

be

harmed

if

the

Court

only

reviewed

IFFA

the

Order

Approving Settlement, for IFFA could raise the same arguments
and could obtain the same relief if it only challenged the Order
Awarding Seniority.

IV. RECOMMENDATION
A.

TWA's and

the Plaintiffs'

Motions:

I

recommend

that

these motions be denied.
1. May IFFA Challenge the Order Approving Settlement?
In my view, IFFA has standing to challenge this order.
DC had not approved that portion of

If the

the settlement agreement

that provided for the re-employment of Subclass B members, there
would

have

individuals.

been

no

award

of

competitive

seniority

to

those

The settlement agreement expressly authorizes the

DC to determine the appropriate amount of competitive seniority
to be awarded to re-employed plaintiffs.

The plaintiff class

admits that the settlement agreement is "the underpinning to the
order which granted competitive seniority."

- ...

..
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2.

If the Court Does Not Limit Its Review to the Order

Awarding Seniority, Should It Direct the Dismissal of Nos. 781545 & 78-1549?

No.

The parties are free to stipulate to the

dismissal of these petitions pursuant to Rule 53.
have not chosen to do so.
to

the

dismissal

of

However, they

The parties are not willing to agree

these

petitions

until

the

settlement

agreement is final.
Plaintiffs move the Court to direct the dismissal of Nos.
78-1545

and

Settlement
believe

78-1549
is

IFFA

on

the

no

longer

is

entitled

ground

subject
to

to

that

the

judicial

challenge

the

Order

Approving

review. ·
Order

Since I
Approving

Settlement, I would deny this motion.
Assuming
final,

that

the Order Approving Settlement

is

not

yet

I do not think Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 can be dismissed

as moot.

If the settlement were to fall through,

plaintiff

class

could

litigate

the

issues

TWA and the

presented

in

those

petitions.l2
B. Limitation of the Grant in No. 80-951 & Deferral of No.

12As discussed below, if No. 78-1545 does not become moot,
the Court will already have ruled in No. 80-951 that the timely
filing requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

.

"'
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I

78-1549:

suggest

limiting

eliminate question #3.13

the

grant

in

No.

80-951

to

I believe question #2 in many respects

merges into question #1.14

Thus, in No. 80-951 the Court would

be left with the two major issues the Court granted certiorari
to address.
If

the Court were

requirement

is

not

to decide

jurisdictional

(a)

that

the

or

(b)

that

timely

filing

although

the

timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, the DC was entitled
to approve

the

settlement of

would be approved.

that

issue,

then

the

settlement

Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 would be dismissed

as moot, and the CA's 1978 decision could then be vacated.
If

the

requirement

Court were
is

to decide

jurisdictional

(c)
and

that
that

the
the

timely
DC

filing
lacked

13The issue of whether the order awarding competitive
seniority had an unsually adverse impact on incumbent employees
relates only to the facts of this case. Furthermore, there is
no analysis of this issue in the DC's order or the CA's opinion.
14As
discussed
above,
see note 9,
IFFA' s
arguments
regarding the need for a "finding" of a Title VII violation
ultimately focus on whether or not the claims of Subclass B are
jurisdictionally barred.
TWA recognizes this, stating that
"Point II of the union's petition, attacking the seniority
allowance for lack of a finding of a violation of Title VII,
means that a violation was not established because there was no
jurisdiction." TWA's Motion, at 9.

-18-

jurisdiction to approve the settlement of the claims of Subclass
B, then either the entire settlement would fall through or the
settlement

of

Subclass

B's

claims

would

fall

through.l5

On

remand, the effect our ruling would have on the enforceability
of the settlement agreement would be resolved by the DC in the
first instance.

However, the Court could still dispose of No.

78-1545 by writing a

~

curiam stating that the CA correctly

held (in its 1978 opinion) that the timely filing requirement is
a jurisdictional matter and citing the decision in No. 80-951.16

15The settlement agreement does not state what effect a
partial reversal of the DC's approval of the settlement
agreement would have on the parties' agreement.
Plaintiffs
state that "if this Court holds that the District Court lacks
jurisdiction, TWA will undoubtedly disavow the Settlement
Agreement as being unenforceable." Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 45.
16The issue raised in No. 78-1545 is the same issue that
is inherent in question #1 in No. 80-951:
Is the timely filing
requirement a jurisdictional matter?
However, in No. 78-1545
plaintiffs raise that issue in the context of reviewing theCA's
1978 holding that timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement,
while in No. 80-951 IFFA raises that issue in the context of
reviewing the CA' s 1980 holding that a settlement that avoided
litigating this issue was proper.
In No. 80-951, IFFA will argue that timely filing is
jurisdictional
and
that
the
issue
may
not
be
settled.
Plaintiffs and TWA will argue that the issue may be settled
whether or not it is jurisdictional.
Plaintiffs probably will
also contend that the timely filing issue may be settled because
it is not a jurisdictional matter, with TWA taking a contrary

••

•
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As

for

No.

78-1549,

I

question

whether

any

of

the

issues

presented in that petition warrant review, and I would defer it
by removing it from the argument calendar.

If it does not later

become moot, it could be DIG'd.l7

position.
17The first issue in No. 78-1549 is whether the DC
properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability.
TWA's policy clearly precluded any mother from working as a
flight attendant. Although TWA states that it did not have any
male "flight attendants" during this period, it concedes that it
had male cabin attendants called "pursers" on international
flights. TWA did not terminate male cabin attendants who became
fathers.
The second issue is whether it would be unfair to require
TWA to award back pay to these plaintiffs. TWA asserts that at
the time the "no-motherhood" policy was in effect (from 1965 to
1970) it was not at all clear that such a policy violated Title
VII. Therefore, retrospective relief would be inequitable.
The third issue is whether the CA erred in defining
Subclass A (those who met the timely filing requirement). There
are two parts to this argument.
(1) The CA held that "permanent
termination" occurred when the flight attendant became a mother.
TWA contends that permanent termination occurred on the flight
attendant's last day of work.
This is simply a matter of
construing TWA's policy.
The CA described the policy as
follows:
"[Female flight attendants] who became mothers either
by childbirth or by adoption were terminated permanently unless
they
were
willing
to
accept
employment
in ground duty
positions."
(2)
The CA held
that
plaintiffs
who
were
permanently terminated as flight attendants in the 90-day period
preceding the filing of EEOC charges were in Subclass A.
It
also held that the following type of plaintiff was in Subclass
A: a flight attendant who became a mother and then returned to a
ground duty position {pursuant to TWA's policy) although she
wanted to return to a flight attendant position, and who was
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Conclusion:

I would (1) deny TWA's and plaintiffs' motions;

limit the grant in No.
defer

or

dismiss

No.

80-951 to Questions #1 and #2;
78-1545;

and

(4)

defer

No.

(3)

78-1549

(2)
not
by

removing it from the argument calendar.

I suggest that we enter the
"TWA's motion to limit rev1ew in No. 80951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., to the
order of the district court entitled "Order
Awarding Seniority" and thereafter to dismiss
No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World
Air 1 ines, Inc. , and No. 78-1549, Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al., as moot is
denied.
"The motion filed by petitioners in No. 781545 (the "plaintiff class"), requesting that
the Court (1) grant TWA's motion; or (2) order
TWA and the plaintiff class to stipulate to
dismissal of the writs in No. 78-1545 and 781549; or (3) dismiss No. 78-1545 and No. 78-1549
as moot, is denied.
"No.

78-1549

is removed from the argument

still working in that ground duty position during the 90-day
period
preceding
the
filing
of
EEOC
charges.
The
CA
distinguished United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 (1977).
In Evans the discriminatory policy was not in effect during the
90 days preceding the filing of EEOC charges.
If the Court determines that these three issues do not
warrant review, the Court might be inclined to DIG No. 78-1549
at this point.
However, I am reluctant to finalize the CA' s
1978 decision before the settlement is final.

••
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calendar, and further consideration of that case
is deferred. The writ of certiorari in No. 80951 is limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented in
the petition for a writ of certiorari and is
otherwise dismissed as improvidently granted."

.

May 12, 1981
Federation

80-951,

Dear Byron:
Your proposed order (p. 20 of your memorandum) is
fine with me.
I appreciate your doing this careful study for the
benefit of all of us.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.·
,.~. ~ 4.'-;
I

•

.:

~u:prttttt

Qfourl cf fltt~~ ~fattg

~Mlyt:ngicn.tB. <!J. 21Jc?J!.2
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 12, 1981

Re:

80-951, 78-1545 and 78-1549 - Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants

Dear Byron:
Thanks for your thorough memorandum with
the conclusions of which I agree.
I would
be glad to subscribe to the order you propose.
Sincerely yours,

Justice \.\Thi te
Copies to the Conference

.

'

.§u:p-rmu <!fourl of firt 'Jlfuittb .§ta:U.a'
'Jllfa,gfringLtn. ~. <!f. 20&!J!. ~
CHAMBERS OF

I

. l

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 13, 1981

.l

I

l
II
I

RE:

Nos. 78-1545, 1549 and 80-951 Zipes v. TWA; Ind.
Fed. of Flight Attendants v. TWA

Dear Byron:
I too agree with your recommendation and proposed
Order in the above.

Your memorandum was certainly most

persuasive as well as very complete.
Sincerely,

Justice White
'

1

'l
I

I

I

'

I

cc: The Conference

.:§u.prrmt ~o-urt cf tqt ~tb ;§tafrg
2.tagfringttnt. gl. QJ. 2!J~J.1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 13, 1981
Re:

No. 78-1545) Zipes v. TWA
No. 78-1549) TWA v. Zipes
No. 80-951 ) Ind. Fed. of Flight Attendants v. TWA

Dear Byron:
I concur with your recommendations and thank you for
undertaking the task of studying the cases as thoroughly
as you did.
Sincerely,

~

V"
Justice White
cc:

The Conference

:"f.

..§u.pumt <!Jttnrl of tqt 'Jlln:ilib ..§hdts
JlasftittgLtn. ~. "f. 2Ugt~~
CHAMBERS OF

May 13, 1981

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

(78-1545) - Zipes v. TWA, . Inc.
(78-1549) - TWA, Inc. v. Zipes
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No. 78-1545, Ann Zipes, et al. v. TWA, Inc.

(Case 1)

~~~~-~Jt!-~
~ ~~ ~~~~~~-u~l-

No. 80-951,

Indep~hdent Federation of Flight Attendants

~

2.

Case 2.

The initial question (in reviewing the CA7's 1980
~

decision) is whether a DC can approve a settlement in which an award
is made to a group whose claims have been held beyond the court's .
jurisdiction by the CA.

The answer to this question might, of

course, depend on whether the claims were actually jurisdictionally
barred.
The next question is whether competitive-status seniority
rights can be awarded--under the standard for awarding such rights
articulated in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S.
747 (1976)

(once discrimination has been shown, full seniority

should be awarded discriminatees in absence of unusual
circumstances)--by a court pursuant to a settlement delegating that
decision to the cqurt when only the employer and the pltf class have
\

agreed to the settlement.

I.
1.

Case 1.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Resp TWA had a policy of terminating female

(but not male) flight attendants when they became parents whether by
birth or adoption.

On May 30, 1970, a charge was filed with the

EEOC challenging this practice.

EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter,

and a complaint was filed on Aug. 18, 1970, on behalf of a class
which included all TWA hostesses who had been fired after becoming
mothers at any time after July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title
VII.

One of the initial class representatives was the union then

representing TWA's flight attendants, the Air Line Stewards and
Stewardesses Ass'n (ALSSA). 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages •

.-

3.

In 1971, TWA and the class representatives reached a
settlement which provided for the rehiring of each class member with
the amount of seniority held at the time of her termination.
settlement was approved by the DC.

The .

Several class members appealed,

and the CA7 reversed because of a conflict between ALSSA as class
representative and ALSSA as union representing currently-working
attendants.

The settlement was vacated and the case remanded with

instructions to replace ALSSA as class representative.
In 1976, the DC awarded summary judgment in favor of the
~

pltf class on liability.

Judge McGarr found that the "no-

motherhood" policy was discriminatory and that the Title VII time
limits did not bar the claims of any class members.

An

interlocutory appeal was taken. 2
In the decision on review in Case 1, the CA7 again
reversed the DC.

W\.-

lt17%

The CA7 held that the claims of approximately 92%
1\

'-.

of time.

These

individuals had been terminated more than ninety days prior to May
30, 1970, the filing date of the first EEOC charge, and §706(d)
required that charges be filed within ninety days of the
discriminatory practice.

The CA7 held that the Title VII time

requirements were 'urisdictional prerequisites and thus there was no
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of the vast majority of

1 Flight attendants are now represented by Independent
Federation of Flight Attenaants (Union), which is petr in case 2.
2During the pendency of the appeal, on April 1, 1977, petr
Union became the new collective bargaining representative for TWA
flight attendants.

the pltf class.
The pltf class
that the lower courts did have jurisdiction over the claims of

al~

class members and that the deft had waived any statute-of-

-----

limitations defense.

Thereafter, the parties moved to defer

consideration of the cert petns in order to negotiate a new
settlement.

This request was granted, but the petns were eventually

granted with the grant of cert in case 2--which reviews a subsequent
CA7 decision approving a settlement the parties reached after this
Court defered consideration of the cert petns on case 1.
2.
settleme n.t .

Case 2.

The pltfs and TWA reached a second

It establishes tliO sub-classes
11

.--..

11

fJ.L:
~·
u~
.. ~aa.t:t~r

:

consisting of approximately 30 individuals whose claims are based on
acts within ninety days of the filing of a charge,

and ~ ,

consisting of 400 members whose claims are time-barred.

TWA agreed

to pay $1.5 million to each class and to offer a job to each member
of each class.

The DC was to decide whether the returning employees

were to get retroactive competitive seniority.
Upon learning of the new settlement and the likelihood
that many women would be returning to the bargaining unit with large
amounts of retroactive competitive senioity, the Union intervened ~
/10
p~~
and objected. The Union argued that the DC ha~o subject-matter ~
juisdiction to approve the settlement and

grant~

retroactive

~

competitive seniority since the CA7 already had determined that
;;4-

there was no jurisdiction over sub-class B.

tha~he s~ttlement

The union also argued

could not override the collective bargaining

agreement between TWA and the Union.

...

•· .

..

5.

The DC overruled the Union's jurisdictional challenge on
the ground that the CA7's decision was not final and not, therefore,
binding.

A hearing was held to determine the impact the

would have on the current bargaining unit members.

settleme~t

A few weeks

later, on Nov. 8, 1979, the DC entered two separate orders:

and (2)

awardin

full retroactive seniority to

~

(1)

subclasses.

Although the DC's brief order awarding seniority does not cite any
cases, it clearly uses the standard articulated in Franks v. Bowman.
The DC stated:

"the

cour ~ finding
~

that full restoration of

etroactive seniority will not have an unusual adverse impact upon
c rrently employed flight attendants in a manner which is not
typical of other Title VII cases."

Petn for Cert in No. 80-951 at

18a.
The Union appealed the award of seniority by the DC, but
the CA7 affirmed the DC.

It held that, despite its earlier ruling

regarding the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the DC
nonetheless had jurisdiction to approve a class-action settlement
and to grant seniority pursuant to that settlement over the Union's

~

objections.

[~:~(2)
~- /

~

It relied on (1) principles favoring settlements and

the notion that parties should not be forced to litigate the

contested issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court noted

that because the airlines hires 400-800 attendants in a normal year,

less than a year.

-~~

/1-?~~
3.

~.cu~.~~

Hold in No. 78-1549. ___.. Cert was

6.

originally ~

No. 78-1549 as well as the two cases being argued, but it

was~~

removed from the argument list and consideration deferred pending .
I (

the outcome of the two argued cases.

No. 78-1549 is a conditional

'V\

cross-petn filed by TWA challenging the DC finding of liability
prior to the entry of the settlement order and seniority-award order
on Nov. 8, 1979.

I~

-

the settlement order is affirmed--regardless of

how this Court disposes of the seniority order--No. 78-1549 can be
dismissed as moot since TWA's objections to liability are
conditional:

~

~

if the settlement order stands, TWA has no objections.

As Justice White pointed out at 19 of his memo of May 11,

)~

{? fl),J) 1981,

(discussing proper disposition of No. 78-1549 and

several ~ 0/

~\!\motions), it is unlikely that any of the issues in No. 78-1549 ~

~rrant

~e

review even in the even the settlement order were overruled.

suggested that it be DIG'd in the event it does not

becom~

The issues involve (1) whether the no-motherhood policy really
violated Title VII;

(2)

whether it was unfair to require TWA to

pay back pay to pltfs for the period 1965-1970 when it was not clear
that such a policy violated Title VII;

and (3) whether the CA erred

in defining subclass A (those who met the timely filing
requirement) .

This last objection is based on fact-bound arguments

dealing with termination dates, etc.

II.
A.

CASEl:

Backgroud:
(1)

IS FILING A CHARGE A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE?
Statute and Caselaw
The statute.

At the time the pltfs' charge was filed

in 1973, §706(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

u.s.c.

§2000e-

5 (d) (1970) 3 provided:
1-l

~. ,

"A charge ••• shall be filed [with the EEOC] within ninety
days after the a l i eged unlawful employment practice ==r
OcCb rred .••• "
Thus, the statute provides that suit can be brought on the basis of
a charge filed with the EEOC during a certain time period.

Although

it is clear that in the typical case, suit cannot be brought unless

-

a timely charge has been filed, it is not clear whether that
requirement
is absolute or whether it is subject to equitable
...__--~ ::::.
considerations that might weigh in favor of extending the time limit
----~

(e.g., fraud).

Typically, the question is framed as whether the

time-limit is a statute of limitations (subject to equitable
considerations) or jurisdictional (failure to meet time limit is an
absolute bar to judicial consideration of a claim) .
Implicit in this issue is the question of who has the
burden of pleading and proving either compliance or non-compliance
with the requirement.

Although a pltf must plead and prove

compliance with a jurisdictional prerequisite, failure to meet a

5~~
t..-1.-

statute of limitations is a matter that must be raised as an ~
affirmative defense under rule 8(c) of the Fed. R. of Civ. P.
is an intermediate possibility:
condition precedent to suit;

~

the provision can be regarded as a

as such, it would be regarded subject

to tolling in light of equitable considerations, but would remain a
matter for the pltf to plead and prove.

3 In 1972, §706(d) was amended to allow filing of a charge
within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. It is now
codified at 42 u.s.c. §2000e-5(e). The filing provision will be
referred to herein as "706(d} ."

..

vo

(3)

Prior decisions of this Court.

(a)

Use of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" in past

S. Ct. decisions.

The Court has discussed the filing requirement on

several occasions and has used a variety of terms in referring to

---------..

it.

In Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972)

(Stewart, J.), the

Court held that the filing requirement should not be interpreted in
an overly rigid manner (so as to require multiple filings in some
situations) and referred to it as a "statutory prerequisite."

Id.

at 523.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

u.s.

792 (1973)

(Powell, J.), the Court noted in presenting the background of the
J

case that "[r]espondent satisfied the ~ urisdictional prerequisites

,,

to a federal action (i) by filing timely charges of employment
discrimination with the Commission and (ii) by receiving and acting
upon the Commissions's statutory notice of the right to sue."

Id.

at 798 •
. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(Powell, J.), the Court held that an employee's resort to labor
arbitrartion did not bar a Title-VII action.

In doing so, the Court

noted that the petr had met the "jurisdctional prerequisites"
defined "with precision" in Title VII:
and (2) a right-to-sue notice.

(1) a timely-filed charge,

Id. at 47.

In Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S.
229 (1976)

(Rehnquist, J.), the petrs argued that the statutory

period for filing a claim with the EEOC should toll during the
pendency of grievance of arbitration procedures under the
collective-bargaining contract.

The Court ruled that the statutory

9.

period was not tolled, and noting that this was not a case in which
a party had been prevented from asserting its rights.
n.lO.

Id. at 237

In response to petrs' argument that tolling would impose

almost no costs and only slight delays, the Court explained that
"the principal answer to this contention is that Congress has
already spoken with respect to what it considers acceptable delay
when it established a 90-day limitations period, and gave no
indication that it considered a 'slight' delay followed by 90 days
equally acceptable."

l

Id. at 240.

The Court noted that adherence to

the limitations period "assures the employer of [notification] of an
alleged violation."

Id. n. 14.

Finally, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
{1977)

u.s.

553

{Stevens, J.), the Court held that the employer had not

continued to violate Title VII by refusing to credit resp {after rehiring her in 1972) with pre-1972 seniority.

The Court noted that a

claim based on her original termination in 1968 was now time-barred,
and that "[t]imely filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a
Title VII action."

Id. at 555 n.4 {citing Robbins & Myers and

Alexander, discussed above).
{b)
Ricks,

Limitations period.

- - U.S.

In Delaware State College v.

, 101 S. Ct. 498, 506 {1980)

{Powell,. J.), the

Court referred to the timely-filing requirement as a "limitations
period."

And in Robbins v. Myer, discussed above, the there were

several refernces to "tolling the limitations period."

u.s.

229.

E.g., 429

Evans also used the statute-of-limitations label as well

as the "jurisdictional prerequisite" label.

For other examples of

cases using limitations labels, see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.

t"',: 1

10.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977);
McDonald, 432

u.s.

u.s.

United Air Lines, Inc. v.
~

385, 391-92 (1977);

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447

807, 818-813 (1980).
(c)

I

~

Supreme Court consideration of similar provision in

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has a filing

~rement

similar to that in Title VII.

See 29

u.s.c.

§626(d).

It is likely the Court will construe the two provisions in the same
manner.

See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979)

("We •.. hold that under §14(b) of the ADEA, as under §706(c) of
Title VII, resort to administrative remedies in deferral States by
individual claimants is mandatory, not optional.").
In Dratt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. 2d 1256, 1258-60 (CAlO
1976), the CAlO viewed these filing requirements as analogous to
Title VII and drew upon Title VII precedents in determining whether
equitable modification was available to the plantiff.

It concluded

that the filing requirement was subject to tolling and estoppel.

As

the parties note, this Court affirmed by an equally divided Court
(4-4).

Shell Oil Co. v. Dratt, 434

u.s.

99 (1977)

(per curiam).

I

checked the Conference notes, and the Court would have held that the
filing requirements were not jurisdictional, though only four were
willing to find actual tolling in that case.
tolling ground (such as fraud or infancy) ;

There was no equitable
the CAlO allowed tolling

simply because the deft received notice that the pltf had a
grievance within the statutory period.
Only CJ thought the limitations period juridsdictional.

Jt P~~

WJB, BRW, TM, and HAB thought that the limitations period was not
jurisdictional, and that notice to the deft was enough to toll it •

..

c-;t/7 ~

11.

no~fc?ti~ ~t£ ~
tolling c~~
in the cas~~~

You, WHR, and JPS considered the period
would only have applied equitable
which were supported by the facts

{3)

Decisions in the CAs.

In Coke v. General Adjustment

Bureau, 640 F. 2d S84 {CAS 1981) {en bane)

{Anderson,

J)

the CAS

overruled an earlier CAS decision that had regarded the filing
requirement of the ADEA as jurisdictional, and the CAS considered
the new rule applicable in Title-VII cases as well as ADEA cases.
In this decision, the CAS held that Title VII and ADEA were subject
to equitable tolling and that, in the case before it, summary
judgment was inappropriate because there was a material fact in
dispute relevant to equitable tolling based on misrepresentation and
reasonable reliance. 4
Before overruling its prior decision, the CAS undertook a
thorough analysis of the entire area, including the current
I L

positions of the other CAs.

'"

The CA7 currently stands alone in

holding that timely compliance with the charge-filing provisison is
"jurisdictional" in the sense that compliance with it determines the
jurisdiction of the DC regardless of circumstances in the case
supporting tolling on equitable grounds.
4The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the summary-judgment motion had been made, were:
{1) the employer misrepresented to a client that the demoted
employee would be reinstated in his old position;
{2) the
employer knew or should resonably have known that the client
would convey the misrepresentation to the employee; and {3) the
employee reasonably relied on the misrepresentation in
forebearing to file a claim. 640 F. 2d at S9S-96.

~

r~

J'-'(J

,

.LI.o

CA9, ~)~~

that

the charge-filing period is subject to equitable modification.

See

Six CAs (CA3, CAS, CA6,

Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Corp, S89 F. 2d 829, 832-833 (CA3 1979):
Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F. 2d 386 (CAS 1981): Leake v. City of
Cincinnati, 60S F. 2d 2SS, 2S9 (CA6 1979):
2d 1208, 1212-1214 (CA9 1980):
(CAlO 1974):

Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.

Sanchez v. TWA, 499 F. 2d 1107, 1108

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., S67 F. 2d 429, 474

(CADC 19 7 6 ) , c e r t • denied , 4 3 4 U• S • 1 0 8 6 (19 7 8 ) •
The CA4 has not considered the issue with respect to the
charge-filing period, but it has held that the suit-filing
limitations period, Title VII §706(f) (1), 42
is subject to equitable modification.

u.s.c.

20000e-S(f) (1),

Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual

Ins. Co., 469 F. 2d 268, 269 (1972), cert. denied, 410
(1973).

u.s.

The CAl and the CA2 have left the question open.

v. King's Dept. Stores, Inc., 608 F.

939
Daughtry

d 906, 909 (CAl 1979):

Smith

v. American President Lines, Ltd., S71 F. 2d 102, 109 (CA2 1978).
In Satz v. ITT Financial Corp., 619 F. 2d 738, 74S n.ll (1980), the
CAB noted that, "Congress appears to have regarded the time period
as a statute of limitations."

(4)

Legislative history.

The legislative history

provides no definitive answer, but, on balance, suggests that the
time limit should not be regarded as a jurisdictional bar but rather
as something more akin to a statute of limitations.
in SG's brief at lS-18.

See discussion

For example, when the filing period was

extended from 90 to 180 days in 1972, both the House and Senate
Committee reports referred to the enlarged period as either a

. .,

"limitation period" or a "statute of limitations" that is "similar"
or "identical" to the limitations period of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) 5--and the CAs have uniformly held that the NLRA
provision is a statute of limitations subject to recognized
equitable doctrines, rather than a restriction on the NLRB's
jurisdiction. 6

Discussion

B.

Congress legislates against a background of judically
created equitable exceptions to seemingly preclusive time
limitations.

See, e.g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414

U.S. 538, 558-59 (1974):
(1965).

Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R., 380 u.s. 424

Given this backgroud, it is unlikely Congress meant to

deprive courts of the power to consider untimely claims in cases in
which, for example, employer fraud caused the filing delay.

Another

reason that the Court might not consider the filing of a claim a
true "jurisdictional prerequisite" is the fact that the Court does
not require that each member of a class file one.
Lines v. McDonald, 432 u.s. 385, 389 n.6 (1977).

See United Air
This is unlike the

approach taken with regard to jurisdictional amounts in class
actions brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

There, each

class member must meet the jurisdictional minimum in order to

5

SeeS. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971):
Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971).

H.R.

6see, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F. 2d
429, 475 n.351 (CADC 1976) •

.. ·,.,I'
'

participate.
(1973).
Although a reasonable opinion could be written either way,
it seems unnecessarily har h to hold that no equitable exception can ~
ever be recognized, not even employer fraud.

I would therefore

suggest that the statute be interpreted as allowing tolling in the
traditional equitable situations:
infancy or temporary insanity;
the filing of a suit;

(2)

deft

-

--

legal disability such as

specific legal prohibitions on

and (3) fraudulent or other misleading

conduct on the part of the deft.
course, present

(1)

in~ t~is_ cas ~.

None of these factors was, of
Here, the only issue is whether

(TWA) waived the statute of limitations.

That question

addressed in the next subsection, but there is still a final
question that must be considered with regard to the proper treatment
of the timely-filing requirement.
As mentioned earlier, an implicit issue in the question
whether the filing requirement is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" or
a "statute of limitations" is whether it is a matter for the pltf to
plead and prove of something the deft must raise as an affirmative
defense.
position:

And, as I mentioned above, there is an intermediate
the requirement can be regarded as a "condition

j

precedent,"
subject to equitable considerations, but the pltf's
___.
responsibility to plead and prove. 7

~~~

~~

7FELA time limits have been treated as condition
precedents. In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. 231,
235 (1959), which disagreed with several earlier FELA cases, the
Court permitted non-compliance with the FELA time limit to be
excused by estoppel because the deft had induced the pltf's
Footnote continued on next page.

•··

JJ~ ~~
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1/l£/.~ _J~r:~ C:#Z
~~
1

The current practice seems to be for

------

timely filing in the complaint.
~11

he plft to plead a

See I Joint Appendix (JA) at 7a,

(pltfs plead it in complaint in case at bar).

As a matter of .

_________.

reasonable allocation of responsibilities, this seems right.

It

after all, the pltf that is responsible for filing the complaint
who should know when (and whether) it was done.

Moreover, I think

the Court's earlier use of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite"
reflected an appreciation of this point.

This approach was adopted
in EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F. 2d 187, 190 (CA9 1974) • 8

I looked at the other CA opinions cited in subsection A.3, supra, as
holding that the filing-period is subject to equitable modification,
but none of them focus on who should plead and prove what.
In conclusion, I would suggest that the filing-period
not a jurisdictional prerequisite, i.e., it is not a limit on
power of the courts to hear claims.

Instead, it is akin to a

statute of limitations in that it is subject to equitable
modification.

But, under the statute, the burden of filing

complaint is on the employee, and the filing should, therefore,
treated as a condition precedent to suit--something to be
proved by the pltf.

Such a holding would merely continue what

appears to be the current practice of the parties.

delay. But the pltf was required to plead and prove how he was
misled by the deft."
8There, the court said that the preliminary requirements of
§706(f) (1) and (3) were procedural steps that "are most
reasonably considered conditions precedent." The court held that
performance of the conditions could be plead generally as
permitted by rule 9(c).

16.
C.

Did Deft TWA Waive Time Limit?
If the statute is not jurisdictional, not only can it be

tolled, the deft can waive non-compliance if he so chooses.

-----

The

pltf class argues that the deft has waived compliance in the case at
bar.

~---------

See Brief of Pltf Class (red) at 34-35.

on the facts here, there was no waiver.

And TWA argues that,

See Brief of TWA (red) at

/U()r

43-48.
I think it is clear that there was no waiver here
than for purposes of the settlement.

other ~

-

# ~b()Jt

TWA did not raise the "st a_;:=-~

of limitations" as an affirmative defense in its answer

becaus ~

controlling CA7 precedent held that a timely filing was a
"jurisdictional precondition to the commencement of a

~

cour ~

Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F. 2d 357, 359 (CA7 1968).
Indeed, the pltf-class had plead a timely filing, and TWA denied
that contention.

Moreover, the settlement amount was

understanding of all parties that a substantial number of
(92%) were probably time-barred.

The concession to waive

filing during settlement negotiations does not operate
in the event the settlement does not materialize.
If this Court upholds the settlement, waiver is not an
issue--even TWA agrees it was waived timely filing for purposes of
the settlement.

If this Court overrules the settlement for any

reason, however, it will then be important whether TWA waived the
timely-filing requirement.

If it has, then the case should be

remanded with directions to proceed on the merits with regard to
subclass B as well as subclass A without regard to the delay in
filing.

On the other hand, if TWA has not waived the timely-filing

...

'·

.L I

•

requirement {and the settlement is overturned) , the claims of
subclass B should be dismissed on remand.

III.

CASE 2:

CAN DC APPROVE SETTLEMENT TO PLTFS WHOSE CLAIMS ARE
TIME-BARRED?

If the filing requirement is not jurisdictional, it
follows that the DC had power to approve the settlement at issue in
case 2.

{Whether this was done under the proper standard is

discussed in the next section.)
If you regard the filing requirement as jurisdictional,
however, then I think it likely the DC had no power to enter the
court order approving the settlement.

Jurisdiction cannot be

provided by stipulation, consent, waiver, or conduct by the parties.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
and Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341

u.s.

u.s.

237 {1934);

6 {1951).

American Fire

A challenge to a

court's jurisdiction may be raised by anyone at any time, even by
parties who stipulated to or argued for the existence of
jurisdiction at one point and raised the issue for the first time on
appeal.

See Mitchell v. Maurer, supra.

A court, whether trial or

appellate, is obligated to inquire sua sponte into the jurisdiction
of the DC and to dismiss any claim once it is determined that the
court lacks jurisdiction over it.

Id.

Prior to the decision below, there was no doubt that the
principle of limited subject matter jurisdiction applied to court
actions in connection with approval of settlements, class-action or
otherwise.

See United States v. Boe, 543 F. 2d 151, 158-59 {CCPA

1976);

Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112 (CA7 1976).

In

Patterson, the CA7 said "[d]espite the withdrawal [of a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction] the District Court would have no
authority to approve the settlement had it lacked jurisdiction."
528 F. 2d at 112 n.5.
Indeed, in Case 1 of the two decisions before the Court on
cert, the CA7 said, in discussing whether TWA's statements made in
negotiating the original settlement (overruled by the CA7 because of
the Union's conflict of interest) were a waiver of the timely-filing
requirement, the CA7 said:

"we need not reach this question as our

conclusion that this filing requirement was jurisdictional precludes
a finding of waiver."

Petn for cert in No. 78-1545 at Al6.

The CA7 held that the DC had jurisdiction to approve a
settlement even if it lacked jurisdiction over the case because
parties should not be forced to litigate jurisdictional questions.
As the union points out in its brief in No. 80-951 (blue) at 43, the
problem with this argument is that the parties could have reached a
settlement and stopped litigating jurisdictional questions without a
court order--or with a court-approved settlement that did not affect
the rights of anyone other than parties to the settlement.

Instead,

the pltf-class and TWA used the court to grant competitive-status
seniority and supersede the collective bargaining agreement with
regard to rights of those not parties to the settlement agreement
and without any determination, through litigation, that the members
of subclass B had viable and legitimate claims of discrimination.

If the Court considers the filing-requirement a

. 'I

.
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then the DC lacked jurisdiction to

enter the settlement with regard to the claims of subclass B, and
those claims should be dismissed on remand.

The only question then

remaining is whether the DC properly applied the standard of Franks
v. Bowman in deciding to award seniority rights to subclass A.

If,

however, the Court finds that the filing requirement is not
jurisdictional, then the settlement order should be affirmed because
the DC had the requisite jurisdiction to enter it.

The remaining

question then becomes whether, in the seniority-award order, the DC
applied the appropriate standard in determining that all members of
both subclasses should receive full retroactive seniority rights.
These questions are discussed in the next section.

IV.

CASE 2:

-

DOES STANDARD OF FRANKS v. BOWMAN APPLY TO AWARD OF

--

CONPETITIVE-STATUS SENIORITY BY COURT PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES BUT NOT INCLUDING AWARD OF SUCH SENIORITY?

In the case at bar, the employer and the pltf-class did
not actually reach an agreement on competitive-status seniority
rights.

Instead, they reached a settlement in which one term

provided that the DC would award the appropriate competitive-status
-------~----~------------------------------------------seniority. We are not dealing, therefore, with a situation in which
~

the employer and the pltf-class have actually agreed upon a
settlement that includes the award of specified amounts of
competitive-status seniority.

If such a settlement were reached, it

could not be enforced absent court approval, because neither the
employer nor the pltf-class has the power to modify seniority
,...-----....-

~

·.
'

.

/~

ri hts 9 of absent employees.

20.

If such a settlement--awarding

specific competitive-status seniority--were presented to a court for
its approval the court should approve the award of competitivestatus seniority only under the standard that should apply in the
case at bar.

In other words, whatever standard is appropriate for

court-ordered seniority in cases such as this one should also be
used when the employer and the pltf-class seek court approval of a
settlement they have worked out granting competitive-status
seniority.
The ~
pltf class, the vEEOC, and vTWA all argue that the

~
~

Franks-v.-Bowman standard was the proper one to apply in this
They argue that there was a finding of liabiltiy by the DC,

c;:~~

that TWA's no-parenthood-for women policy violated Title VII.

If

some claims were barred, it was only by the technical filing
requirement.

J

i.e., ~

Under such circumstances, a court can modify seniority

rights and can award class members full-competitive seniority in
order to place the pltfs in the position they would have been in but
for the discrimination as long as there was no unusual (in
comparison with other Title VII cases} circumstances cautioning
9 It is true that under Franks v. Bowman and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977},
employees' seniority rights are not vested property rights
entitled to the protection of the due process clause. But this
does not mean such rights are entitled to no protection in any
circumstances. Indeed, courts routinely protect such rights in
many circumstances. And, as discussed in text in IV.B.2(a}
infra, §703(h} of Title VII affords some special protection to
bona fide seniority plans within the context of Title VII itself.

.

"'•

21.
against such awards (the standard of Franks v. Bowman).

A.

Standard for Settlement of Claims of Subclass A
1.

If filing requirement not jurisdictional.

If the DC

did have jurisdiction of approve the settlement, then there has been
a determination of liability to which no one objects (the only
objection to liability is in TWA's cross-petn in No. 78-1549 which
raises the objection only in the event the settlement order is
overruled).

In this situation, the settlement is really only a

settlement as to damages.

Viewed in this light, the Court properly

used the Franks v. Bowman standard.
To put the same point another way, the Union can challenge ~
the lower court's award of retroactive
on two grounds:

seniority~

subclass

A~

(1) that there was really no violation of Title VII

by the no-parenthood policy (and therefore no basis for liability)
or (2) that the awards of competitive seniority in this case were
unreasonable given the disruption they may cause with regard to the
current employees, as discussed in the following section IV.B (i.e.,
although there was liability, the remedy afforded in the settlement
is unreasonable).

Cert was, however, not granted on #2 (cert was

not granted on question 3 of petn in No. 80-951).

And the Union

does not argue that the no-parenthood policy was legal--indeed, the
predecessor Union filed the original charge of discrimination
against that policy.
When there is a finding of liability to which the Union
does not object, an award of seniority under the Franks standard is
proper.

In this situation, the only uncontested issued is the

22.
appropriate remedy--and Franks groverns that award.
2.

If filing requirement is jurisdictional.

If the DC did

not have jurisdiction to approve the settlement over subclass B,
then the settlement-approval order will be overruled.

If the

settlement-approval order is overruled, then this question (should
Franks v. Bowman standard apply to award of seniority in
settlement?) becomes moot--except that, on remand, another
settlement might be worked out and the appropriate standard for
determining whether to award full competitive-status seniority
rights will again be relevant.

As discussed below, such rights

should be awarded under the usual (Franks) standard in a settlement
only when liability has been determined and is uncontested.
(I don't think the Union really objects to the award of
seniority benefits to subclass A, though it might be a good idea to
clarify this point at oral argument.

Only 33 persons from subclass

A are expected to return to work.)

B.

Standard for Settlement of Claims of Subclass B
1.

If filing requirement is jurisdictional.

If the

filing requirement is jurisdiction, this issue disappears because
these claims are jurisdictionally barred and should be dismissed on
remand.
2.

If filing requirement is not jurisdictional.

violations of Title VII are time-barred.

Here, all

Through the DC's award of

competitive-staus seniority, a bona fide seniority system has been
modified because there was once a violation of Title VII.

And that

modification was adopted without the consent of affected workers and

23.
under the standard of virtually automatic standard of Franks:
authorizing such grants to remedy past discrimination in the absence
~

of circumstances not present in the typical Title-VII case.

This Court's prior cases suggest that the standard of ~
Franks v. Bowman should not apply in settlement situations.
Franks v. Bowman itself, the Court indicated that on the

remand, ~

competitive-status seniority would only be awarded to those
actual victims of discrimination.

See 424

u.s.

In ~

~~

at 762 ("whether an

award of seniority relief is appropriate under the remedial
provisions of Title VII, specifically, §706(g)."}.
And in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

u.s.

553

(1977), the Court held that a time-barred discriminatory act cannot
be the basis for modification of a valid seniority system.

Such

systems are protected by §703(h) of Title VII, which provides that:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer. to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, ..•• "
In Evans, the Court held that the fact that a person was in a lower
position, seniority-wise, than would have been true had there been
no past discrimination did not itself constitute a violation of
Title VII.

In so doing, the Court noted that "a challenge to a

neutral system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past
event which has no present legal significance has affected the
calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event might at one
time have justified a valid claim against the employer."

431 U.S.

at 560.
In the settlement, the DC modified seniority under a bona

fide seniority system on the basis of time-barred claims.

This

result is clearly contrary to Evans except insofar as the court
order of competitive-status seniority changes analysis.
two questions implicit in this issue:

{a}

There are

under what standard

should a DC award {or approve} the grant of retroactive seniority
rights pursuant to a settlement to which the union and current
employees have not agreed?

and {b) what issues should the union {or

current employees} be able to raise in objecting to such a
settlement?

{a}

What should be the standard when there has been no

uncontested finding as to liability?

As discussed above at 21-22,

when there has been a determination of liability by the DC to which
the Union does not object, any settlement between the employer and
the pltf{s} is only a settlement as to damages and the Franks v.
Borman rule should apply.

But when there has been no uncontested

finding of liability, and the DC awards {or approves} the grant of
retroactive seniority pursuant to the terms of a settlement, it is
allowing an adjustment in a bona fide seniority system without any
final finding of a viable claim of discrimination.

The rights of

the pltf{s} to the relief is not clear as it was in Franks.

On the

other hand, it would be unfortunate to adopt a rule precluding the
grant of any retroactive competitive seniority pursuant to a
settlement without Union approval of the settlement.

Such a rule

would make settlements difficult and would give Unions the power to
block even reasonable grants of retroactive seniority to any group
or individual.

25.

Given the competing policy considerations in the settlement
situation--the need to protect the rights of current employees in
the absence of any final finding of a viable claim of discrimination
and the desire to create an environment in which settlements are
possible--! think the best solution would be to hold that the DC has
discretion to award appropriate seniority in light of all the
relevant equitable factors. For example, in the case at bar, the DC
should not have applied the automatic Franks v. Bowman standard, but
should have given careful consideration to the fact that any award
to subclass B is at the expense of other workers who were working
the unpopular flights during the years subclass B slept on its
rights.

I would suggest that a rule not unlike that you proposed by

the Franks dissent is appropriate when the DC is awarding (or
approving) competitive-status seniority under a settlement.
In ~ Franks dissent (joined by Justice Rehquist)

(CJ

wrote separately but said he was in general agreement with you), you
argued that the language of Title VII did not support the automatic
grant of competitive-status seniority and that the DC should have
the discretionary power to determine when such relief is appropriate
given the competing equities of each case.

I

ag~h

dissent and, at a minimum, the rule it proposes

~h

~

the Franks

be adopted as

the standard when retroactive competitive-status seniority is
awarded in settlement agreements.
In summary, it would be inconsistent with Evans and
extremely unfair to expand the majority rule in Franks to grant
automatic retroactive competitive-status seniority to pltfs in
settlements when there has been no final finding of liability.

Any

26.

automatic grant in such circumstances would enable employers to
settle their liability by a grant of relief costing the employer
nothing at the expense of current employees.
If the standard of Franks should not apply in settlement
situations, then the DC's award of retroactive competitive-status
seniority should be vacated and the case remanded for it to consider
the award to subclass B in light of the proper standard.

---------

If this

happens, it is possible that subclass B will not receive full
retroactive seniority. 10
Re-employment will occur as vacancies (not filled by a nonclass member with greater seniority} arise, and there are many other
ways in which seniority is relevant to priorities in job selection.
See Union's Brief (blue} 6-11.

Changes in relative seniority may

have major implications in terms of a person's ability to continue
to meet responsiblities that may have been assummed in reliance on a
person's current status.

For example, an attendant might have

accumulated enough seniority to bid and get a "cream-puff" run-i.e., a daily flight during weekdays allowing her to work while her
children are in school.

Such a person may be vulnerable to

10 Although cert was not granted on whether the detrimental
impact on current employees is so great as to preclude the grant
of competitive-status seniority in this case (question 3 in petn
No. 80-951}, the question framed in text does not address that
question but rather whether the Farnks standard should apply at
all in determining whether to award such seniority in cases such
as this involving settlements. That question is in question 2 of
petn No. 80-951. Question 2 states the question as whether the
DC should have applied the standard of Franks without regard to
the fact that there has been no finding on liability--in other
words, in a settlement situation.

27.
"bumping" by class members with retroactive seniority after relying
on--and making who knows what arrangements--what seemed to be her
fixed and definite seniority under contracts between TWA and Union.
Seniorty changes may also force current employees to
relocate to new cities as their home bases (or commute).

TWA's

flight attendants work out of domiciles or base stations located in
N.Y., Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles.
Because the DC used the standard of Franks v. Bowman,
there is only limited data on the extent to which the grant of
retroactive competitive seniority will affect TWA's current
employees.

-- - -

Subclass A has 33 or so members, but 172 members of

subclass B are expected to return to work.

It is true that TWA has

over 6000 attendants and normally hires 400-800 per year, but in the
18 months prior to the settlement, 400 had been laid off.
present time, 305 11 are on lay off. 12

At the

In II J.A. at 132-138 there

are some charts with information relevant to the effect returning
pltfs will have, but these charts do not show whether the seniority
changes will result in changes in the home cities of any current
employees or cause major changes in the schedules of current
employees.

Instead, they only reveal information such as the fact

11The excess workforce is higher than this figure because
contractual provisions require that TWA offer leaves of absence
in order to reduce the number of lay-offs.
12
TWA has been through rough times lately. The 305 were
laid off in two groups: 164 on June Oct. 30, 1979 and 141 on
June 30, 1980.

·,

.
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that San Francisco is currently the home base for 665 employees and
that 30 returning classmembers from subclass B are expected to want
to reside there.

Id. at 138.

To summarize, as the discussion of subclass A's settlement
~

(see 21-22) indicates, if there is a finding of liability by even
the DC (without appellate review) prior to settlement, I see no
reason not to allow the use of the Franks standard unless the union
contests the employer's liability.

When there is no finding of

liability or when the Union contests liability, then the standard of
the Franks dissent should be used in deciding whether to award
seniority.
(b)

When retroactive competitive-status seniority is

awarded by DC pursuant to settlement, what issues should Union be
able to challenge?

The remaining question is what issues should the

Union should be able to raise in challenging the grant of seniority
under such a settlement?

There are good reasons why the Union

should be able to challenge only the award of competitive-status
seniority itself (under the standard of the Franks dissent) rather
than every issue settled by the settlement.

That issue is, of

course, the only one with which the Union is really concerned.

If

the award is unfair (under the standard of the Franks dissent) the
Union can and should challenge the unfairness directly--for example,
in the case at bar it can argue against the grant of automatic
competitive-status seniortiy to those who have slept on their rights
for up to five years at the expense of innocent employees who worked
the graveyard flights during that period.
If the Union were allowed to litigate everything, e.g.,

..

29.

underlying liability, settlements would be almost impossible.

Even

when only one pltf sued, the union would be able to block any
settlement awarding competitive-status seniority by fighting all the
other issues.
settlements.

As a result, it would be difficult to reach effective
In considering competing equities under the standard

of the Franks dissent, the DC can of course consider the likelihood
that the pltf(s) have live, legitimate claims of discrimination--but
there is no reason to allow the union to block the settlement by
fighting liaility all the way to the s.ct. provided the DC does take
such factors into account in balancing the competing equities.
Since the union's legitimate interest can be protected by allowing
it to challenge the remedial grant of competitive-status seniority
under the discretionary standard of the Franks dissent, there is no
need to allow it to disrupt settlments by litigating other issues,
such as the employer's liability.

V.
A.

CONCLUSION

Timely Filing Is Jurisdictional
If the failure to file a charge is a jurisdictional

defect, then the DC lacked jurisdiction to enter the settlement and
both the settlement order and the seniority-award order should be
vacated.

On remand, the claims of subclass B should be dismissed as

time-barred because there can be no waiver of a jurisdictional
requirement.

The pending cert in No. 78-1549 should be DIG'd (no

certworthy issue).

Since there has been a finding of liability with

regard to subclass A (uncontested by anyone other than TWA and TWA
is bound by the earlier finding) the DC will be free to enter a new

30.

settlement as to damages between subclass A and TWA.

Because

liability will have been determined, 13 retroactive competitive
seniority can be awarded to that subclass in such a settlement unqer
the standard of Franks v. Borden.

B.

Timely Filing Is Not Jurisdictional
If the filing requirement is not jurisdictional, then the

l\

,,

settlement order should be sustained.

Cross-petn in No. 78-1549

should be dismissed as moot since it contains TWA's objections to
liability in the event the settlement is not upheld.
The question then becomes whether the DC erred in applying
the standard of Franks v. Borman to the award of seniority rights
under the settlement.
With regard to subclass A, the application of the Franks
v. Borman standard was
proper because there was a finding of
....
uncontested liability as to sublass A (only TWA would contest
liability and then only if the settlement were not upheld).
The DC did err in applying the Franks v. Borman standard
to the question of seniority rights of subclass B.

With regard to

these claims, there had been no finding of liability, let alone a
finding uncontested by the union.

Indeed, when the DC ordered the

grant of competitive-status seniorty, all claims of subclass B had
----------~-------------------b en found time-barred. In this situation, the DC should have
awarded competitive seniority under the standard of the Franks
13 The DIG of No. 78-1549 makes the earlier finding of
liability final and conclusive as to TWA •

..

31.

dissent rather than the standard of the Franks majority.

The order

awarding seniority should be vacated and the case remanded for the
DC's consideration of whether retroactive competive-status seniority
is appropriate when all the relevant equities are considered •
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meb 11/27/81

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

Nos. 78-1545 & 80-951, IFFA v. TWA & Zipes, et. al.

In its reply brief (your copy is attached), the Union
makes a strong argument that without either (1) a final judicial
finding of liability or (2) the union's agreement to a settlement, a
court simply lacks the power to affect seniority rights awarded
under a collective-bargaining agreement.
13-18.

See IFFA brief (yellow) at

This argument is not without merit.

Relief is given in

Title VII suits under §706(g), but §706(g) authorizes courts to
award relief to remedy violations that are not time-barred.
settlements, there is no final finding of a violation.

In

Even if the

DC had made such a finding at the time of the settlement (which it
could not have because the CA7 had held subclass B's claims timebarred), that finding would not have been a final finding, at the
end of litigation; settlements are always premature ends to
litigation.
The only argument against this point is a policy one--this
approach might give unions too much power to block awards of
competitive-status seniority in settlements even when reasonable.
don't have any idea whether the rule the union proposes would make
it too difficult to reach settlements.

I

78-1545 ZPIES v. TRANS WORLD

Argued 12/2/81
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RE:

No. 78-1545 and 80-951

Zipes v. T;~ w::_:~

ttu_ ~

f-/ ~ 1-rvtlU.-{

Some of us were concerned whether the Franks v.
Bowman remedy of retroactive seniority was proper here.

I

~ ~
~ ~

You may be interested in the attached memorandum of my
clerk Mary Mikva on that question.

~ ~

Jl::i)

r-~?.
W.J.B.Jr.

RE: 78-1545 and 80-951
TO:

Justice Brennan

FROM:

Zipes v. TWA

w~~

Mary Mikva

IT(

~()fo-0

~9~~

DATE: December 8, 1981
I have some

~

on Zipes (78 1545 and 80-951).

First1 to clarify some

ackground.

plaintiffs' union when

The ALSSA, which was

th~~

suit was filed in 1970 was originally

the plaintiff

A settlement was first reached in
...,).

1971.

During

lement

hearings~

waived any statute of

-

limitations defense

That settlement had no retroactive

seniority or backpay, and the CA 7 threw it out on the basis that ·
the union had conflicting interests since it represented
incumbent employees and plaintiffs.

The present plaintiffs were

appointed to represent the class and the case was consolidated
with the American Airlines case.

In 1974 TWA moved to and was

granted leave to amend its answer to assert a statute of
limitations defense, but the DC noted that the delay in asserting
that defense might ulimately constitute a waiver of that defense.
In Oct.
class

of~~he

memb~~who

DC denied the airlines' motion to exclude

were terminated more than 90 days ' before the

~G

~

&:.--·~

filing of the
charge.
___...__.,

The DC accepted the airlines'

argument ~

that the timely-filing requirement was jurisdictional, but found
that there was a "continuing violation."

Three days after that

order the DC granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
~

~-

-------------------~----~----

the basis that the airlines' policy of firing or grounding
mothers, but not fathers, violated T. VII.

.
.

.

Then the plaintiffs

-

-2-

settled with American Airlines, the settlement was upheld, and
cert. was denied.
into this mess.
the finding

TWA appealed the S.J. and that's what got them
The 1978 decision by the CA 7 (78-1545)

that ~

upheld

"no-mothers" policy violated T. VII but

C/1 7

~
~--------~--------------~----~~~

reversed the finding that there was a continuing violation.

Because the CA7 also believed timely filing of a complaint was ~ 4
'
f3u;:f- <:: 4 7
jurisdictional, it expressly did not consider the argument that
TWA might have waived the defense of statute of limitations by
failing to assert it for four years.

Accordingly the judgment

was reversed as to 92% of the plaintiff class.

While petitions

for cert were pending, the parties settled.
With this background--! think you can avoid the Franks-Evans

'? 7

problems that concerned Justices White, Marshall and Powell in

,

pel~~

this case.

was upheld insofar as t e the court found that the
policy violated T. VII.

o-1

"no-mothers" ~

The CA7 reversed as to 92% of the

~ ~c

plaintiffs solely on the basis of the defense that the charges
were untimely.

(We, in turn have reversed the CA7 on the

of the untimeliness )reopening

th~ossibility

.I

~

~

and that finding

There was a finding

1

'

~~4
11

~

p(

effect ~
~

that it would not ~~

4</J?

have been a valid defense even without the 1979 settlement
because · the Airline waived it by its failure to assert it for
four years and/or its explicit waiver in the 1971 settl e ment.)
At any rate, that def e nse, even

as ~ uming

that it is meritorious,

does not affect the fact that the non-plaintiff union members

~~
~. 7

/( were JLunjustly enriched ' 'by the employer's discriminatory practice.

--------------

But for this discriminatory practice the plaintiffs would have

..

'1

·.

-3-

~:lh-1-~k
j~~¥W~_f~~
~~~

continued to accrue seniority
either be unhired or woul
this unjust enrichmen

,_ -'-~~

d the other union ~me~~o ~.~~

ave less seniority.

.~
Si

.A

•

~~~--'{

~ s~

that underpins the Court's op~

re~ / ~

Franks, see 424 U.S. at 776, there is no basis for
use of the retroactive-seniority remedy the Court
there, in this case.

.

appr~f ~
~

This makes this a very unique

is no occassion to reach the issue in this case of

ca~

whet~~

Franks remedy is appropriate in the usual settlement

si~

where there has been no finding of liability--e.g. where the
are unsettled questions of fact or law which could res
finding that the practice itself was not

discriminator ~

This is, in essence, the reasoning of the CA7
the American Airlines settlement.·

whe~ ~~

There the court not etf YJ;:r'{i o

they dealt with a case where settlement

followed

summar~~~

judgment and the plaintiffs had almost earned through
litigation the remedy proposed in Franks.

~

ful~~

See Airline Stewards &

Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960, 9645 n.9 (1978).

The only difference between that case and this one

is that there the CA7 had not yet passed on the timeliness issue
so

~he

question of whether the plaintiffs' claims were timely was

unsettled.

In essence, however, this issue was also unsettled in

this case since petitions for cert. were pending and the CA7 had
decided the issue differently than every other circuit.
I don't think Evans is really a problem to this approach.
The Court held in Evans that a violation which is not the subject
of a timely claim is in effect not really a violation and

can

not, therefore, be a basis for seeking retroactive seniority when

-4-

•

the employer voluntarily rehires a discriminatee.

Although the

dissent, which you joined, has a valid argument, it seems that
all the Court really did was to enforce the statute of
limitations.
Franks,

The Court said explicitly, in distinguishing

that it dealt only with the issue of whether there was a

violation and did not reach any remedy issue.

431

u.s.,

at 559.

meb 12/12/81

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

December 12, 1981

Mary

In Re:

No. 78-1545, Ann Zipes, et al. v. TWA, Inc. &
No. 80-951,

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants

I remain troubled by the Franks-Evans problems presented in
this case.

The waiver, if any, was by TWA, not the Union or its

members, none of whom

~guilty

of any discriminatory acts.

In

any event, the waiver issue disappears if the settlement order is
affirmed because it included an explict waiver for purposes of
settlement.

The question remains, however, whether, in awarding

retroactive seniority to the pltf-class in the seniority-award
order, the DC erred in awarding that relief under the standard of
Franks v. Bowman.

I believe that an award of such relief under that

standard is inconsistent with United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

u.s.

553 (1977) and unfair to current employees who worked the

unpopular flights to earn their seniority while the pltf-class slept
on their rights.
In Evans, the fact that the airline had discriminated
against the pltf was not in dispute.

Evans had been forced to

..

2.

resign in 1968 by the company's policy that stewardesses could not
be married, though stewards could be.
policy violated Title VII.

And the CA7 had held that the

See Sporgis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.

2d 1194 (1977), cert. denied, 404 u.s. 991 (1971).
Yet, in Evans, the Court held that §703(h)--not just the
filing requirement, as suggested in the memo sent by Justice
~

--

Brennan--precluded any grant of seniority based on Evans'
termination.

The pltf argued that the refusal to give her the

seniority she would have had but for the act of discrimination was a
continuing violation of Title VII and that she should, therefore, be

--

able to file a charge now alleging this discrimination and receive
the seniority she would have had but for the past disciminatoy act.
In considering whether there was a continuing violation,
the Court rejected the argument that Franks v. Bowman, 424 u.S.747
(1976) supported the award of seniority to the pltf.

The Court

explained that Franks only dealt with the appropriate remedy after
there had been findings of discrimination and of a timely charge:
"When that case reached this Court, the issues relating to
the timeliness of the charge and the violation of Title
VII had already been decided; we dealt only with a
question of remedy. In contrast, in the the case now
before us, we do not reach an remedy issue because
respondent did no
ile a timely c arge ased on her 1968
separat1on and she as no a e e
acts establishing a
violation since she was rehired in 1972." Id., at 559
(footnotes ommitted).
-Thus, in Evans, the Court indicated that there were two

I

prerequisites to the award of retroactive seniority under the Franks
standard: a violation and a timely charge.
After thus explaining that the Court in Franks had been

solely co~rned with remedy, the Evans Court went on to explain that

3.

§703(h) 1 "highlighted" the "difference between a remedy issue and a
violation issue."

Id.

The Court noted that:

"As we held in [Franks], by its terms that section does
not bar the award of retroactive seniority after a
violation has been proved. Rather, §703(h) 'delineates
which employment practices are illegal and thereby
prohibited and which are not.'" 431 u.s., at 553 (quoting
424 U.S., at 758)."
The Court then held that past discriminatory acts could not form the
basis for a challenge to a neutral, non-discriminatory seniority
system:
"But ••. a challenge to a neutral system may not be
predicated on the fact that a past event which has no
present legal significance has affected the calculation of
seniority credit, even if the past event might at one time
have justified a valid claim against the employer. A
contrary view would substitute a claim for seniortiy
credit for almost every claim which is barred by
limitations. Such a result would contravene the mandate
of §703(h)." 431 u.s., at 560.
Thus, in Evans, the Court held that, in the absence of a finding of
a timely charge and a violation of Title VII, "the mandate of
§703(h)" barred an award of seniority inconsistent with a neutral,
nondiscriminatory, seniority system.
In the case at bar, it is true that there was once a
finding of a timely charge, but that finding had been overruled by

1 Title VII, §703(h), 42

u.s.c. 703(h):

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system •••
provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to disciminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin •.•• "

..

>'
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the CA7 prior to the entry of the seniority-award order by the DC.
The two prerequisites for relief under Franks were not, therefore,
met.
In Evans, the Court stated that a pltf had no right to an
order awarding retroactive seniority if the requirements of a timely
charge and a violation of Title VII had not been met.

But in the

case at bar, if we affirm the seniority-award order, we would hold
that if the employer--who has no interest in who receives
competitive-status seniority--agrees to allow a DC to award such
seniorty retroactively in a settlement, the DC can award the
seniority under the Franks standard without finding that timely
charges have been filed.

In other words, although a pltf has no

right to such relief under such circumstances because of the
"mandate of §703(h) ," a pltf can be given such relief by a court
provided the employer does not object.
If that is true, the "mandate of §703(h)" protects neutral
seniority systems only when the employer--not the union or the
beneficiaries of the system--considers protection appropriate.
Although competitive-status seniority rights are not vested property
rights beyond the remedial scope of Title VII, see Franks, 424 U.S.,
at 778, such rights are determined by a contract between the
employer and the union and are not amenable to unilateral change by
the employer at the request of third parties.

When such rights are

adjusted by a Court awarding relief under the Franks standard, the
court has found a violation of Title VII and a timely charge and the
adjustment is ordered to make the victims whole.

The award is

justified by the fact that the current employees are merely being

~··

5.

placed in the positions they would have been, relative to the
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place.
When there has been no finding of a past violation of the
Act, the situation is, of course, otherwise, and the Conference
would apparently agree that retroactive competitive-status seniority
should not be awarded under the fairly automatic standard of Franks.
When there has been no filing of a timely charge, an award
of retroactive competitive-status seniorty is necessarily unfair to
~

current, innocent employees.

It is argued that current employees
l(

,,

have no ground for objecting because they have been unjustly
enriched by the employer's discriminatory practice.

During the

years the pltf-class slept on its rights, however, these employees
worked the unpopular flights in order to accrue seniority.

That

seniority is something they have earned, not a bonus unjustly or
arbitrarily given to them rather than another.

The pltf-class, on

the other hand, has neither (1) worked for the right to retroactive
compeitive-status seniority nor (2) shown that they are entitled to
an award of such seniority because they were discriminated against
and have filed timely charges.

If such seniority is nevertheless

awarded to them under the standard of Franks, it is they who are
unjustly enriched at the expense of other employee who worked to
earn their seniority.

Moreover, employers will be able to settle
Title VII actions by bargaining away the rights of others. 2

2 It is true that it is the DC, not the employer, that actually
entered the order awarding seniority. But if employers and pltfs
know that such awards will be available under the standard of Franks
provided the employer agrees, the employer will be able to use chips
belonging to current employees in settling lawsuits with Title VII
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

I think the DC court erred in applying the Franks
standard, 3 in awarding competitive status seniority.

In awarding

such relief pursuant to a settlement, a DC should carefully consider
the equities of the situation.

If the settlement includes a waiver

of a time-bar, the DC should nevertheless consider whether it is
unfair to award retroactive competitive-status seniority to pltfs
who slept on their rights while others worked to earn their
seniority.

pltfs.
3Although the DC did not cite Franks, it did award relief
under the Franks standard: "full restoration of retroactive
seniority w1ll not have an unusual adverse impact upon currrently
employed flight attendants in a manner which is not typical of other
Title VII cases."
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December 14, 1981

I
80-951 Independent Federation v. TWA

'·

Dear Bill:
Thank you for circulating a copy of Mary Mikva's
interesting memo of December 8.
It is a helpful summary of
the sitatuion.
At Conference, we were all together - as I recall
- in 78-1545, but less harmonious with respect to the claim
of the union in 80-951. Although I still am not entirely at
rest, my concern as to the validity of the grant of
retroactive competitive seniority remains.
I have not yet found any holding that TWA, prior
to the settlement that is here at issue, waived the statute
of limitations issue. Even if TWA may be said to have
waived it as a part of the settlement, it is not at all
clear to me that the present contract between TWA and
respondent Union can be changed unilaterally by TWA at the
request of third parties in a settlement negotiation.
This is quite different from Franks v. Bowman,
where the Court had found both a violat1on of T1tle VII and
timely filing of charges. The Court then awarded relief on
the theory that the current employees were merely being
placed in the position they would have been, relative to the
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. Two
elements had been found to exist: discrimination and timely
charges. Here, admittedly subclass B had not filed timely
claims. In fact, many of their claims were several years
old. Thus, in the absence of a waiver (and I am not
saisf ied there was a valid waiver as to the union) ·, one of
the essential elements of Bowman is absent.
Nor can I agree that the employees who took the
places of the subclass B employees are "unjustly enriched".
They are not strike breakers. Rather, they are innocent
employees who - in many instances - have worked for years on
unpopular flights in order to accrue their present

2.

seniority. This is now something they have · earned, not a
bonus unjustly accrued.

.<!'.

In sum, if I understand this case correctly, an
employer attempted to settle a Title VII action in part by
bargaining away the rights of others. This seems unfair,
and unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary that
I have not yet identified, I remain inclined to dissent on
this issue. I acknowledge, however, that from the outset
this has been a confusing case •

··.~·.~

'

• f

I
I

Sincerely,

.j

I
'

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

'

.-

The Conference

December 14, 1981
80-951 Independent Federation v. TWA
Dear Bill:
Thank you for circulating a copy of Mary Mikva's
interesting memo of December 8. It is a helpful summary of
the sitatuion.
At Conference, we were all together - as I recall
- in 78-1545, but less harmonious with respect to the claim
of the union in 80-951. Although t still arn not entirely at
rest, my concern as to the validity of the grant of
retroactive competitive seniority remains.
I have not yet found anv holdtng that TWA, orior
to the settlement that is here at issue, waived the statute
of limitations issue. Even if TWA may be said to have
waived it as a part of the settlement, it is not at.. all
clear to me that the present contract between TWA and
respondent Union can be changed unilaterally by TWA at the
request of third parties in a settlement negotiation.
This is quite different from Franks v. Bowman,
where the court had found both a violation of Title VII and
timely filing of charges. The Court then awarded relief on
the theory that the current employees were merely being
placed in the position they would have been, relative to the
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. Two
elements had been found to exist: discrimination and timely
charges. Here, admittedly subclass B had not filed timely
claims. In fact, many of their claims were several years
old. Thus, in the absence of a waiver (and I am not
saisfied there was a valid waiver as to the union), one of
the essential elements of Bowman is absent.
Nor can I agree that the employees who took the
places of the subclass B employees are "unjustly enriched".
They are not strike breakers. Rather, they are innocent
employees who - in many instances - have worked for years on
unpopular flights in order to accrue their present
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seniority. This is now something they have earned, not a
bonus unjustly accrued.
In sum, if I understand this case correctly, an
employer attempted to settle a Title VII action in part by
bargaining away the rights of others. This seems unfair,
and unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary that
I have not yet identified, I remain inclined to dissent on
this issue. I acknowledge, however, that from the outset
this has been a confusing case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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December 15, 1981
Re:

80-951

Inde pendent Federation v. TWA

Dear Bill:
I am in substantial accord with Lewis' letter to you
of December 14th, which finds this case substantially
different from Franks v. Bowman.
Since rely,
?.;'~--~

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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January 4, 1982

Re:

78~l545

and 80-95l . . . Zipes v. - TWA

Dear Byron:
Please add a note stating that I did not participate
in the consideration or decision of these cases .

Justice White
Copies to the Conference .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 78-1545,

~AND

80-951

ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

~~

78-1545
TRANS WORLDVAIRLINES, INC.

~I(~

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT /~) ~
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER
-n- ~ ~. . r- ~ ~n.
80-951
v.
../..L- ~ ~
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.
~ "' ~
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ,/..,./._. ~ • ~· "~
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
~~of

(j.. _
.
~'H.t., lZJI"'" ~

[January-, 1982]

JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question in this case is whether the statutory ~
....
time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil '...-:'~~~~~~,.,_,~""'{
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., is a jurisdictional pre~ 7 77 •
requisite to a suit in the District Court. Secondarily, we resolve a dispute as to whether retroactive seniority was a .J _ ..,
proper remedy in this Title VII case.
~ '-• ;T ' II"

~s~~
I
In 1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses AssociaJ....--2.... ~
tion (ALSSA), then the collective bargaining agent of Trans ,Lo ~~
World Airlines (TWA) flight attendants, brought a class action alleging that TWA practiced unlawful sex discrimination ~
in violation of Title VII by its policy of grounding all female ~
flight cabin attendants who became mothers, while their male /1A.J~..L,.JuJ~ ~
counterparts who became fathers were permitted to continue; ~.-:-__----r

/3

,~-~~

.

..\

,

:7;r;::::;:-

~~~
~~~
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flying. After collective bargaining eliminated the challenged
practice prospectively, the parties in the case reached a tentative settlement. The settlement, which provided neither
backpay nor retroactive seniority, was approved by the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, found the union to be an inadequate representative
of the class because of the inherent conflict between the interests of current and former employees. It remanded the
case with instructions that the District Court name individual
members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class representative.1 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines Inc., 490 F. 2d 636 (CA7 1973).
Upon remand, petitioners in No. 7~1545 were appointed
as class representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer
to assert that the claims of plaintiffs and other class members
were barred by Title VII's "statute of limitations" because
they had failed to file charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time
limit. 1 App. 89a. 2 Although the District Court granted
the motion to amend, it noted that the "delay in pleading the
defense of limitations may ultimately constitute a waiver of
the defense." 1 App. lOla.
Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court denied TWA's motion to exclude class members who had not
filed timely charges with the EEOC. In support of its mo1
The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who were
terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965 for reasons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to include
only those who would have resumed flight duty after becoming a mother
but for TWA's policy forbidding this. In re Consolidated Proceedings in
the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1147 and n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class
thus included both former employees and current employees, that is both
those who declined and those who accepted ground positions.
2
When this suit was filed, 42 U.S. C. §2000e-5(d) (1970 ed.) required
charges to be filed within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred. In 1972, this section was amended to extend the time
limit to 180 days and was renumbered § 2000e-5(e).
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tion, TWA argued that instead of an affirmative defense analogous to a statute of limitations, timely filing with the EEOC
was a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver by any
action of the defendants. While the District Court agreed
that the filing requirements of Title VII are jurisdictional, it
denied the motion on the basis that any violation by the airlines continued against all the class members until the airline
changed the challenged policy. 1 App. 131a-32a. On October 18, 1974, the District Court granted the motion of the
plaintiff class for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's
liability for violating Title VII. 1 App. 134a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18,
1976, granting summary judgment on liability, expressly
holding that "TWA's no motherhood policy . . . provides a
clear example of the discrimination prohibited by
§ 2000e-2(a)." In re Consolidated Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1145 (CA7 1978). It declined,
however, "to extend the continuing violation theory, as did
the district court, so as to include in the plaintiff class those
employees who were permanently terminated more than 90
days before the filing of EEOC charges." ld., at 1149.
The Court ~f App_eals went on to hold that timel~ filing of
EEOC charge§.....was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because
TWA could not wa1ve tfie timely ffilng requirement, the
Court o~und that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jursidictionally barred by the failure of
those plaintifffs to have filed charges of discrimination with
the EEOC within 90 days the alleged unlawful employment
practice. The Court of Appeals, however, stayed its mandate pending the filing of petitions in this Court. Petitions
for certiorari were filed by the plaintiff class, No. 78-1545,
and by TWA, No. 78-1749. This Court granted a motion to
defer consideration of the petitions pending completion of settlement proceedings in the District Court. Pet. App. No.
80-951, at 3a.
In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District

\.I
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Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of
some 30 women, comprised those who were terminated on or
after March 2, 1970, as well as those who were discharged
earlier, but who had accepted reinstatement in ground duty
positions. Subclass B, numbering some 400 women, covered
all other members of the class and consisted of those whose
claims the Court of Appeals had found to be jurisdictionally
barred for failure to satisfy the timely filing requirement. 2

J.A. 3.
The proposed settlem~nt divided three million dollars between the two groups. It also provided each class member
with full company and union seniority from the date of termination. The agreement specified that "in the event of the
timely objection of any interested person, it is agreed that
the amount of seniority and credit for length of service for the
compensation period will be determined by the Court in its
discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section ~' 3 and
all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or
objection by TWA." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80--951, p.
29a.
The Independent Federation of Flight Attendents (union),
which had replaced ALSSA as the collective bargaining agent
for the flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to
object to the settlement. On the basis that the Court of Appeals had not issued the mandate in its jurisdictional decision,
the District Court rejected the union's challenge to its jurisdiction over Subclass B. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
Section !06(g) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976 ed) provides:
"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
8

1
•
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8~951, p. 15a. After holding three days of hearing, the District C~_~o_yed tb~t and awarded com~titive semonty. It explicitly found that full restoration of retr~iority would not have an unusual adverse impact
upon currently employed flight attendants in any way atypical of Title VII cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 8~951,
p. 18a-19a.
The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court
of Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement or order retroactive seniority
with respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning that "the principles favoring settlement of class action law suits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over
the action." Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, Local550 v. Trans World Airlines, 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169
(CA 7 1980). It further explained that the question of jurisdiction as to Subclass B had not been finally determined because a challenge to its decision was pending before this
Court and that the Courts of Appeals were split on the issue.
The Court of Appeals noted that the district court clearly had
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass A. It
concluded, "Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not
settled with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate
the issue of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that
is otherwise appropriate for district court approval." I d., at
1167.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority.
According to the court, the settlement served the public policy of remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the consequences of those past act. Moreover, "the right to have its
objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the
right to block any settlement to which it objects." lbid. 4
'The Court of Appeals relied on language in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 780 (1976):

jj L ~
~
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The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80-951. We
granted its petition together with the petition in No. 78-1545
and No. 78-1549, - - U.S. - - , but later removed the
TWA case, No. 78-1549, 5 from the argument docket and limited the grant in No. 80-951. - - U. S. - - .
II
The ~ingle question inN~ 7§-1545 is wh~er the timely
filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
bringing a Title VII suit in federal court orwlieiller the requirement is subject to waiver and estoppel. In reaching its
decision that the requirement is jurisdictional, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the
statutory language, the absence of any indication to the contrary in the legislative history, and references in several of
our cases to the 90-day filing requirement as "jurisdictional." 6 Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the
same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. 7
[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in
favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the abstract
basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only
on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances
that would not be generally found in Title VII cases.
5
In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability, (b) that
TWA should be required only to grant prospective relief to plaintiffs, and
(c) that the Court of Appeals erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who
had filed timely charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No.
78-1545 and No. 80-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as improvidently granted.
6
See International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers,
429 U. S. 229 (1976); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 555,
n. 4; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,47 (1974); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973).
7
See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F. 2d 981 (CAlO
1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584 (CA5
1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA61979); Hart v.
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We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prere uisite to suit in federal court, but a reqmrement that, li e a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 8
The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this
conclusion.
The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f) (1974), does not
limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a
timely finding with the EEOC. 9 It contains no reference to
the timely filing requirement. The provision specifying the
time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely
J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F . 2d 829 (CA 31979); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 567 F. 2d 429 (CADC 1976).
8
0ne of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No. 80-951 was
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's approval of the settlment of jurisdictionally barred claims. In reaching its
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to
follow McArthur v. Sourthern Airway, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA51978) (en bane).
In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action, holding that
the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had filed a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our holding in No.
7&-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, this issue need not be resolved.
9
42 U. S. C. 2000e-5(0(3), for example, reads:
"Every United States district court and each United States court of a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in
any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice
is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office."
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separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional
tenns or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the the district courts. 10 The legislative history of the filing provision is
sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize the time period for filing a claim as a "period of limitations," 110 Cong.
Rec. 12723, and Senator Case described its purpose as preventing the pressing of "stale" claims, 110 Cong. Rec. 7243,
the end served by a statute of limitations.
Although subsequent legislative history is not dispostive,
see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 686 n. 7
(1979); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444
U. S. 572, 596 (1980), the legislative history of the 1972
amendments also indicates that Congress intended the filing
period to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a jurisdictional requirement. In the Final Conference Committee
section-by-section analysis of H. R. 1745, The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7167, the Committee
not only termed the filing period a "time limitation," but
explained:
"This subsection as amended provides that charges be
filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice. Court decisions under the present law have
shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so
as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of
the law; it is not intended that such court decisions
should be in any way circumsribed by the extension of
the time limitations in this subsection." 11
10
Section 2000e-5(e) (1976) reads simply: "A charge under this section
shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred .... "
11
The Senate Labor Comittee's Section by Section analysis of the 1972
Amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit ... a limitation period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations
Act, as amended." Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-&3 (1971). We
have recognized that the Labor Act was "the model for Title VII's remedial
provisons," International Brotherlwod of Teamsters v. United States, 431

7~1545, 7~1549
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This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Although our cases contain scattered reference to the timely filing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the
requirement was not at issue in those case, and as often or
more often in the same or other cases, we have referred to
the provision as a limitations statute. 12 More weighty inferU. S. 324, 366 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair
labor practice charge under the NLRA operates as a statute of limitations
subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Local 26;4,
Laborer's Int'l Union, 529 F. 2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976); Shumate v.
NLRB, 452 F. 2d 717, 270 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241
F. 2d 130, 133 (CA21957); NLRB v.Itasco Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 504,
506-507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title VII should be treated
likewise.
Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C.§§ 621 et seq.,
which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U. S. 750 (1979), the House Conference report explicitly stated that "the
'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an
action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under this
Act." House Conference Report No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12, reprinted in 1978 U. S. Code Cong & Admin. News 504, 534 (footnote
omitted).
12
As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its opinion in
Coke, supra, at 5~89, references to the filing requirement as a statute
of limitations have come to dominate in our opinions:
"The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In the early
cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time provisions using the label
"jurisdictional prerequisite." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S. 792 ... (1973); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 ...
(1974). In the 1976 Robbins & Myers decision the jurisdictional label was
used once, but there were numerous references to "tolling the limitations
period, "429 U. S. at 239, ... and other labels obviously referring to a
statute of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. See also
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, ... (1977), in which both labels
are used. From and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in
opinions containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of the
jurisdictional label. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432
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ences are to be drawn from other cases, however. Franks
v. ~Bowm~n Jransp_ortation Co., Inc., 424 U. S. 747 (1976),
was a Tille VII suit agi}nst an employer and a union. The
District Court denied relief for unnamed class members on
the ground that those individuals had not filed administrative
charges under the provisions of Title VII and that relief for
them was thus not appropriate. The Court of Appeals did
not disturb this ruling, but we reversed, saying,
"The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of
seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The
first was that those individuals had not filed administrative charges under the provision of Title VII with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore class relief of this sort was not appropriate. We rejected this justification for denial of class-based relief in
the context of backpay awards in Albemarle Paper, [422
U. S. 405 (1975)] and ... reject it here. This justification for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has
been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and
Congress ratified that construction by the 1972 amendments." 424 U. S., at 771.
If the timely filing requirement limits the jurisdiction of
the district court to those claimants who have filed timely
charges with the EEOC, the district courts in Franks and
Abemarle would have been without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the claims of those who had not filed as well as without jurisdiction to award them seniority. We did not so hold. Furthermore, we noted that Congress had approved the Court of
Appeals cases that awarded relief to class members who had
not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC.
It is evident that in doing so, Congress necessarily adopted
the view that the provision for filing charges with the EEOC
U. S. 355, 371--372, ... (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
U. S. 385, 391--391 ... (1980); Delaware State College v. Ricks,- U. S.
- , ... (1980).
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should not be construed to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in the District Court.
In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972), we announced a guiding principle for construing the provisions of
Title VII. Declining to read literally another filing provision
of Title VII, we explained that a technical reading would be
"particularly inappropriate in a statuory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."
404 U. S., at 527. That principle must be applied here as
well.
The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing requirement is not jurisdictional. In International Union of
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229
(1976), we rejected the argument that the timely filing requirement should be tolled because the plaintiff had been
pursuing a grievance procedure set up in the collective bargaining agreement. We did not reach this decision on on the
basis that the 180 day period was jurisdictional. Instead, we
considered the merits of a series of arguments that grievance
procedures should toll the requirement. Such reasoning
would have been gratuitous if the filing requirement were a
jurisdictional prerequisite. 13
Similarly, we did not sua sponte dismiss the action in
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980) on the basis
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of plaintiff's
failure to comply with a related Title VII time provision. Instead, we merely observed in a footnote that "[p]etitioner did
In Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded 180 "limitations
period," enacted by the 1972 amendments, was retroactive. This holding
presupposes that the requirement is not jurisdictional. Moreover, in
reaching this conclusion, we quoted from Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 315-316 (1945): "[C]ertainly it cannot be said that
lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost
through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth
Amendment." Several circuit courts have read Robbins & Myers as implicitly approving equitable tolling. Coke, supra; Hart, supra; Smith v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978).
'
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not assert respondent's failure to file the action within 90
days as a defense." 447 U. S., at 811, n. 9.
By holding compliance with the filing period not to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as
a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78-1545.
III
In No. 80-951, the Union challenges on several grounds
the District Court's authority to award, over the Union's
objection, retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass
B. We have already rejected the Union's first contention,
namely, the District Court had no jurisdiction to award relief
to those who had not complied with Title VII's filing requirement. The Union also contends that in any event there has
been no finding of d18Cr"lmf a i n "th respect to Class B
mem ers an t at the predicate for relie under § 706(g) is
therefore missing. This contention is also without merit.
The District Court unquestiona ly found an unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff class, as a whole, and the
class at that time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A
and B. Summary~ent ran in favor _9f the entire class,
including 5oth tfiose memoers ""WilO""had filed timely Charges
and those who had not. '!'he Court of Appeals affirmed the
sl!!!!mary j_u<!gm~~ ~ as well as tneiillilfng of a diSCriminatoryempiOyrnentpiactice. The court went on, however,
to hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction over claims
by those who had not met the filing requirement and that
those individuals should have been excluded from the class
prior to the grant of summary judgment. But as we have
now held, that ruling is erroneous. The District Court dig
h~e jurisdiction over non-filing class memoer~. Thus, there
was nojunScfiaiOnal barrier to its finding of discrimination

~~~
~~-
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with respect to the entire class. With the reversal of the
Court of Appeals judgment in No. 7S-1545 and our dismissal
of No. 7S-1549, which had challenged the affirmance of the
summary judgment order, the order that found class-wide
e awar of retdiscrimination remains intact an 1s na .
roactive seniority to memoers of SUbclass B as well as Subclass A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory
employment practice.
Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive
seniority contrary~ the collective bargaining agreement
should not be awarded over the objection of a union that has
not itself been found guilty of discrimination. In Franks v.
Bowmq..n, 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) we read the legislative
history of Title VII as giving
"emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole in so far as possible the victims of . . .
discrimination . . . ."
While recognizing that back pay was the only remedy specifically mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that without a
seniority remedy adequate relief might be denied. We concluded that the class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally appropriate under § 706(g).
In Franks, the District Court had found both that the employer had engaged in discrimination and that the discriminatory practices were perpetuated in the collective bargaining
agreements with the unions. 424 U. S., at 751. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324 (1977), however, makes it clear that once there has een
a findin o discrimination
the em o er, an award of retroactive seniority 1s a ro riate even if there is no fin ing
that t e umon as also ille all 1scnmin ted. In Team1es agree to a decree which provided that the

78-1545, 78-1549 & 80-951-0PINION
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District Court would decide "whether any discriminatees
should be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroactive seniority." 431 U. S., at 330, n. 4. Although we held
that the union had not violated Title VII by agreeing to and
maintaining the seniority system, we nonetheless directed
the union to remain in the litigation as a defendant so that full
relief could be awarded the victims of the employers post-act
discrimination. 431 U ...s., at 356, n. 43. 14 Here, as in
Teamsters, the settlement left to the District Court the final
decision as to retroactive seniority.
In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave
the union all the process that was due it under Title VII in
our cases. The union was allowed to intervene. The District Court heard its objections, made appropriate findings,
and determined that retroactive seniority should be awarded.
The Court of Appeals agreed with that determination, and
we have eliminated from our consideration here the question
whether on the facts of this case the Court of Appeals and the
District Court were in error in this respect.
Accordingly, the judgment in 7~1545 is reversed and the
judgment in 80-951 is affirmed.
So ordered.

" In noting that the union in Teamsters properly remained a defendant in
the litigation, we cited to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a). The union in this
case was not joined under Rule 19 when individuals replaced the union as
class representatives, but intervened later. Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1974) (joinder under
Rule 19(a) provides union with full opportunity to participate in the litigation and the formulation of proposed relief, although as practical matter
union not play role in litigation until court finds violation of Title VII).
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Mary

In Re:

Nos. 78-1549 & 80-951, Zipes v. TWA

The opinion is written fairly narrowly.

As an alternative

to dissenting on the implications of United Air Lines v. Evans, it
might be possible either to concurr specially, narrowing the opinion
just a little further, or to suggest a slightly narrower approach to
section III to Justice White.
As expected, the opinion is not entirely consistent with
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

u.s.

553 (1977).

Section II is

--

~/----

not actually inconsistent, since it holds only that there was no
lack of jurisdiction, not that an award of competitive status
seniority was appropriate as a matter of substantive Title VII law.
The language, especially at p.lO, requires careful reading to
perceive this distinction, and Evans is never explicitly
distinguished.

A footnote explaining the distinction might be

helpful.

------------- --- -- is limited to instances in which

The third section is more troubling.
the holding

finding of discrimination.

The good thing is that
there has been a final

There is, as we discussed earlier, a

tension between this holding (award of seniory appropriate because

~~>:,

••

r

there has been
explained that Franks v. Bowman, 424

u.s.

with the appropriate remedy after there had been findings of
discrimination and of a timely charge:
"When that case reached this Court, the issues relating to
the timeliness of the charge and the violation of Title
VII had already been decided; we dealt only with a
question of remedy. In contrast, in the the case now
before us, we do not reach any remedy issue because
respondent did not file a timely charge based on her 1968
separation and she has not alleged facts establishing a
violation since she was rehired in 1972." Id., at 559
(footnotes ommitted).
-Thus, in Evans, the Court indicated that there were two
erequisites to the award of retroactive seniority under
standard: a violation and a timely charge.
It would be possible to affirm the courts below on the
narrow ground that there has been, in this cas~ final finding of
a timely charg

final finding of discrimination.

At the top of 13, the opinion explains that, given the
disposition of the various appeals, the DC order finding
discrimination "remains intact and is final."

This "final and

intact" finding is an October 18, 1976, summary-judgment order which
holds that the no-motherhood policy did violate Title VII.

It is

final and "intact" (without any remand) with regard to the grant of
summary judgment in favor of subclass B because the CA7 stayed its
mandate of its decision affirming the grant of summary judgment on
the merits, but holding that the claims of subclass B were
jurisdictionally out of time.
By that standard of "final and intact" (order not actually
modified by~formal mandate from CA), there is also a "final and

~
,,~

~
~

\,

"

3.
intact" order that subclass B did file timely

cl~ims

"continuing-violation"-by-failure-to-re-hire theory) .
is reprinted in petn no. 78-1545, at A21.

(using a
That order

It was entered on Oct.

15, 1976, three days before entry of summary judgment, and the two
orders were appealled to the CA7 together.
no. 78-1545, at A2 & A8.

See CA7 decision in petn

Because the CA7 stayed the mandate in its

decision reviewing these orders, see petn in no. 80-951 at 2a, the
Oct. 15, 1976, order finding that timely charges had been filed also
remains "final and intact."
It is, therefore

--

EOS~ble

yet remain consistent with Evans.

to affirm the decisions below,
Under this approach, the DC's

seniority-award order would be affirmed because it is based on
"final and intact" findings of discrimination and of timely charges.
On the other hand, this approach may be entirely too technical, and
it might be better to dissent, noting that you would remand.

Such a

dissent could note that there is a "final and intact" finding of
timeliness and could even suggest that it is not clear what the
majority would have done had that not been true.
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;(I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of
the "timely filing" issue.

But, after 12 years of litigation,

neither the parties nor the lower courts have even focused on
whether the failure to file timely charges should affect the balance
of

~

equities in awarding competitive-status seniority.

the equities of all of the parties--as well as the

Perhaps

for~ecord

set

forth above--justify the Court's judgment approving the settlement.

.T o: The Ch lef' Justice
J ust ice Brennan
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Circul,tr
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Re c..l

l l ua:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 78-1545 AND 80-951

ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
78-1545

v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER
80-951
v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1982]

JusTICE POWELL concurring in No. 78-1545 and concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion.
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000 e-2(h). 1 This was
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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made clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553,
559 (1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I
nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 8~951, in which a
settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive
competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v.
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation since 1970, and in view of its comple~t)/it is difficult to
be certain as to "what happened and whei_V I believe, however, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans
were met.
~ne noted in the Court's opinion, ante at - - , the District Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final and intact. The District Court also entered an order
finding that timely charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is similarly final and intact. The timelycharge order was entered on October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order finding class-wide discrimination.
These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Although the October 18th
order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other order, holding that the members of
Subclass B had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith.
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
2
The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12
ante at and - ; both references are to terms used by the Evans
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement.
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of Title VII because they had not filed timely claims. No
district court order was ever actually vacated because, on the
motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties then reached a settlement. Today, the
Court reverses that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have vacated the October 15th order. As a
result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and class-wide discrimination, are now
final and intact. I therefore concur in the judgment of the
Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status
seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman. 3

I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely
filing'' issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties
nor the lower courts have even focused on whether the failure to file timely
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitivestatus seniority. Perhaps the equities of all of the parties-as well as the
formal record set forth above-justify the Court's judgment approving the
settlement.
3

~---
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JUSTICE POWELL concurring in No. 78--1545 and concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion.
The only question in No. 78--1545 is whether the timely filing
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000 e-2(h). 1 This was
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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made clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553,
559 (1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I
nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a
settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive
competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v.
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation since 1970, and in view of its comple \fJ it is difficult to
be certain as to "what happened and whe
I believe, however, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans
were met.
As the noted in the Court's opinion, ante at--, the District Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final tPHd-int.act. The District Court also entered an order
finding that timely charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is similarly final and intact. The timelycharge order was entered on October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order finding class-wide discrimination.
These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Although the October 18th
order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other order, holding that the members of
Subclass B had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith.
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
2
The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12
ante at - - and - - ; both references are to terms used by the Evans
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement.
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of Title VII because they had not filed timely claims. No
district court order was ever actually vacated because, on the
motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties then reached a settlement. Today, the
Court reverses that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have vacated the October 15th order. As a
result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and class-wide discrimination, are now
final~ I therefore concur in the judgment of the
Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status
seniority under tbP'J~.J<:.>n~~ -z;;-,
·s v. Bowman. 3
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I am not entirely conte with this formalistic resolution of the "timely
filing'' issue. But, after most 12 years of litigation, neither the parties
-eR whether the failure to file timely
nor tfie ~ courts have
charges should affect the alance of the equities in awarding competitivestatus seniority. !Perhaps the equities of all of the parties-as well as the
formal record setfurth above-justify the Court's judgment approving the
settlemenf)
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Nos. 78-1545

AND

80-951

ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

78-1545

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER
80-951
v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

.

[January - , 1982]

.

JUSTICE POWELL, With whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in No. 78-1545 and concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion.
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).' This was made
1

1 801!1"-'

In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 559
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, however, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans
were met.
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at--, the District
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final.
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith.
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
2
The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12
ante, at - - and --; both references are to terms used by the Evans
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement.
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties,
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of
Franks v. Bowman. 3

3
I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely
filing" issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitivestatus seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the settlementas the Court's judgment does today .
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80--951
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_ TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1982]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question in these cases is whether the statutory time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 235, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e et seq., (1970 ed.) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
suit in the District Court. Secondarily, we resolve a dispute
as to whether retroactive seniority was a proper remedy in
this Title VII case.
I
In 1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association (ALSSA), then the collective bargaining agent of Trans
World Airlines (TWA) flight attendants, brought a class action alleging that TWA practiced unlawful sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII by its policy of grounding all female
flight cabin attendants who became mothers, while their male
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counterparts who became fathers were permitted to continue
flying. After collective bargaining eliminated the challenged
practice prospectively, the parties in the case reached a tentative settlement. The settlement, which provided neither
backpay nor retroactive seniority, was approved by the District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, found the union to be an inadequate representative
of the class because of the inherent conflict between the interests of current and former employees. It remanded the
case with instructions that the District Court name individual
members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class representative. 1 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines Inc., 490 F. 2d 636 (CA7 1973).
Upon remand, petitioners in No. 78-1545 were appointed
as class representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer
to assert that the .claims of plaintiffs and other class members
were barred by Title VII's "statute of limitations" because
they had failed to file charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time
limit. 1 App. 89a. 2 Although the District Court granted
the motion to amend, it noted that the "delay in pleading the
defense of limitations may well ultimately constitute a waiver
of the defense." 1 App. lOla.
Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court denied TWA's motion to exclude class members who had not
' The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who were
terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965 for reasons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to include
only those who would have resumed flight duty after becoming mothers
but for TWA's policy. In reConsolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F . 2d 1142, 1147, & n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class thus included both former employees & current employees, that is, both those
who declined and those who accepted ground positions.
2
When suit was filed, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970 ed.) required
charges to be filed within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. In 1972, this provision was amended to extend the time limit to 180
days and is now codified as § 2000e-5(e).
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filed timely charges with the EEOC. In support of its motion, TWA argued that instead of an affirmative defense analogous to a statute of limitations, timely filing with the EEOC
is a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver by any
action of the defendants. While the District Court agreed
that the filing requirements of Title VII are jurisdictional, it
denied the motion on the basis that any violation by the airlines continued against all the class members until the airline
changed the challenged policy. 1 App. 131a-32a. On October 18, 1974, the District Court granted the motion of the
plaintiff class for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's
liability for violating Title VII. 1 App. 133a-134a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18,
1976, granting summary judgment on liability, expressly
holding that "TWA's no motherhood policy ... provides a
clear example of the discrimination prohibited by
§ 2000e-2(a)." In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in
the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1145 (CA7 1978). It declined, however, "to extend the continuing violation theory,
as did the district court, so as to include in the plaintiff class
those employees who were permanently terminated more
than 90 days before the filing of EEOC charges." /d., at
1149.
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that timely filing of
EEOC charges was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because
TWA could not waive the timely filing requirement, the
Court of Appeals found that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jursidictionally barred by the failure of
those plaintifffs to have filed charges of discrimination with
the EEOC within 90 days the alleged unlawful employment
practice. The Court of Appeals, however, stayed its mandate pending the filing of petitions in this Court. Petitions
for certiorari were filed by the plaintiff class, No. 78-1545,
and by TWA, No. 78-1549. This Court granted a motion to
defer consideration of the petitions pending completion of settlement proceedings in the District Court.
In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District

78-1545 & 80-951-0PINION
ZIPES v. TWA

4

Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of
some 30 women, comprised those who were terminated on or
after March 2, 1970, as well as those who were discharged
earlier, but who had accepted reinstatement in ground duty
positions. Subclass B, numbering some 400 women, covered
all other members of the class and consisted of those whose
claims the Court of Appeals had found to be jurisdictionally
barred for failure to satisfy the timely filing requirement. 2
App. 3.
The proposed settlement divided three million dollars between the two groups. It also provided each class member
with full company and union seniority from the date of termination. The agreement specified that "in the event of the
timely objection of any interested person, it is agreed that
the amount of seniority and credit for length of service for the
compensation period will be determined by the Court in its
discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section 706(g), 3 and
all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or
objection by TWA." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80--951, p.
29a.
The Independent Federation of Flight Attendents (union),
which had replaced ALSSA as the collective bargaining agent
for the flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to
object to the settlement. On the basis that the Court of Appeals had not issued the mandate in its jurisdictional decision,
the District Court rejected the union's challenge to its jurisdiction over Subclass B. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
3

Section 706(g) of Title VII , 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C.

§ 2000e-5(g) (1976 ed) provides:

"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is

intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate .. . ."

.
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8~951, pp. 14a-15a. After holding three days of hearing,
the District Court approved the settlement and awarded
competitive seniority. It explicitly found that full restoration of retroactive seniority would not have an unusual adverse impact upon currently employed flight attendants in
any way atypical of Title VII cases. App. to Pet. for Cert.
in No. 8~951, pp. 18a-19a.
The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court
of Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement or order retroactive seniority
with respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning that "the principles favoring settlement of class action law suits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over
the action." Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v.
Trans World Airlines, 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980). It
further explained that the question of jurisdiction as to Subclass B had not been finally determined because a challenge
to its decision was pending before this Court and that the
Courts of Appeals were split on the issue. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court clearly had subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass A. It concluded,
"Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not settled
with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate the issue
of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is otherwise appropriate for district court approval." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority.
According to the court, the settlement served the public policy of remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the consequences of those past act. Moreover, "[t]he right to have
its objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor
the right to block any settlement to which it objects."· lbid. 4

'The Court of Appeals relied on language in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 779, n. 41 (1976):
"[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in
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The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80--951. We
granted its petition together with the petition in No. 78--1545
and No. 78--1549, - - U. S. - - , but later removed the
TWA case, No. 78-1549,S from the argument docket and limited the grant in No. 80--951. - - U. S. - - .
II
The single question in No. 78--1545 is whether the timely
filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
bringing a Title VII suit in federal court or whether the requirement is subject to waiver and estoppel. In reaching its
decision that the requirement is jurisdictional, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the
statutory language, the absence of any indication to the contrary in the legislative history, and references in several of
our cases to the 90-day filing requirement as "jurisdictional." 6 Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the
same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. 7
favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the abstract
basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only
on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances
that would not be generally found in Title VII cases."
5
In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability, (b) that
TWA should be required to grant only prospective relief to plaintiffs, and
(c) that the Court of Appeals erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who
had filed timely charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No.
78-1545 and No. 8{}-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as improvidently granted.
• see Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229, 240 (1976);
United Air Lines, Inc . v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 555, n. 4 (1977); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973).
7
See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F . 2d 981 (CAIO
1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584 (CA5
1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA61979); Hart v.
J .T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F . 2d 829 (CA3 1979); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. , 567 F. 2d 429 (CADC 1976).
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We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 8
The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this
conclusion.
The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f) (1974), does not
limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a
timely filing with the EEOC. 9 It contains no reference to
the timely filing requirement. The provision specifying the
time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely
separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the the dis8

One of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No. 80-951 was
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's approval of the settlment of jurisdictionally barred claims. In reaching its
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to
follow McArthur v. Sourthern Airway, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en bane).
Airlines Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F. 2d, at
1168-1169. In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action,
holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had
filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our
holding in No. 78-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, this issue need not be resolved.
9
42 U. S. C. § 2000e--5(f)(3), for example, reads:
"Each United States district court and each United States court of a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in
any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice
· is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office .. . . "
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trict courts. 10 The legislative history of the filing provision is
sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize the time period for filing a claim as a "period of limitations," 110 Cong.
Rec. 12723, and Senator Case described its purpose as preventing the pressing of "stale" claims, 110 Cong. Rec. 7243,
the end served by a statute of limitations.
Although subsequent legislative history is not dispostive,
see Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S.
572, 596 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S.
677, 686 n. 7 (1979), the legislative history of the 1972 amendments also indicates that Congress intended the filing period
to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a jurisdictional
requirement. In the Final Conference Committee sectionby-section analysis of H. R. 1745, The Equal Opportunity Act
of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7167, the Committee not only
termed the filing period a "time limitation," but explained:
"This subsection as amended provides that charges be
filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice. Court decisions under the present law have
shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so
as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of
the law; it is not intended that such court decisions
should be in any way circumscribed by the extension of
the time limitations in this subsection." 11
10

Section 2000e-5(e) (1976), the amended version of the filing provision,
reads simply: "A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred .... "
" The Senate Labor Comittee's Section by Section analysis of the
Amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit ... a limitation period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations
Act, as amended." S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1971).
We have recognized that the National .Labor Refations Act was "the model
for Title VII's remedial provisons," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 366 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor
practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as a stat-
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This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Although our cases contain scattered references to the timely
filing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the
requirement was not at issue in those case, and as or more
often in the same or other cases, we have referred to the provision as a limitations statute. '2
ute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see
NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F. 2d 778, 781-785 (CA8
1976); Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F. 2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E.
Nettleton Co., 241 F. 2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957); NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg .
Co., 179 F . 2d 504, 50tH507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title
VII should be treated likewise.
Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Stat. 607, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 621 et seq., which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co.
v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 (1979), the House Conference report explicitly
stated that "the 'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs
under this Act." House Conference Report No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 12, reprinted in 1978 U. S. Code Cong & Admin. News 504, 534 (footnote omitted).
12
As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its opinion in
Coke, 640 F . 2d, at 588-589, references to the filing requirement as a statute of limitations have come to dominate in our opinions:
"The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In the early
cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time provisions using the label
jurisdictional prerequisite. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792 .. . (1973); Alexander v. Gardner· Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . .. (1974).
In the 1976 Robbins & Myers decision the jurisdictional label was used
once, but there were numerous references to 'tolling the limitations period,' 429 U. S. at 239, ... and other labels obviously referring to a statute
of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. See also United
A ir Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, . .. (1977), in which both labels are
used. From and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in opinions containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of the jurisdictional label. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC , 432 U. S.
355, 371-372, . . . (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S.
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More weighty inferences are to be drawn from other cases,
however. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424
U. S. 747 (1976), was a Title VII suit against an employer
and a union. The District Court denied relief for unnamed
class members on the ground that those individuals had not
filed administrative charges under the provisions of Title VII
and that relief for them was thus not appropriate. The
Court of Appeals did not disturb this ruling, but we reversed,
saying,
"The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of
seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The
first was that those individuals had not filed administrative charges under the provision of Title VII with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore class relief of this sort was not appropriate. Werejected this justification for denial of class-based relief in
the context of backpay awards in Albemarle Paper, [422
U. S. 405 (1975)] and ... reject it here. This justification for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has
been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and
Congress ratified that construction by the 1972 amendments. . .. " 424 U. S., at 771 [footnote omitted].
If the timely filing requirement were to limit the jurisdiction of the district court to those claimants who have filed
timely charges with the EEOC, the district courts in Franks
and Albemarle would have been without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of those who had not filed as well as without jurisdiction to award them seniority. We did not so
hold. Furthermore, we noted that Congress had approved
the Court of Appeals cases that awarded relief to class members who had not exhausted administrative remedies before
385, 391-391 . . . (1980); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807,
818-823 .... (1980), Delaware State College v. Ricks,- U. S. - , ...
(1980)."
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the EEOC. It is evident that in doing so, Congress necessarily adopted the view that the provision for filing charges
with the EEOC should not be construed to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the District Court.
In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972), we announced a guiding principle for construing the provisions of
Title VII. Declining to read literally another filing provision
of Title VII, we explained that a technical reading would be
"particularly inappropriate in a statuory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."
404 U. S., at 527. That principle must be applied here as
well.
The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing requirement is not jurisdictional. In Electrical Workers v.
Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229 (1976), we rejected the argument that the timely filing requirement should be tolled because the plaintiff had been pursuing a grievance procedure
set up in the collective bargaining agreement. We did not
reach this decision on on the basis that the 180 day period
was jurisdictional. Instead, we considered the merits of a
series of arguments that grievance procedures should toll the
requirement. Such reasoning would have been gratuitous if
the filing requirement were a jurisdictional prerequisite. 13
Similarly, we did not sua sponte dismiss the action in
In Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded 180 "limitations
period," enacted by the 1972 amendments, was retroactive. 429 U.S. at
244. This holding presupposes that the requirement is not jurisdictional.
Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we quoted from Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 31fr-316 (1945): "[C]ertainly it cannot
be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment." Several circuit courts have read Robbins & Myers
as implicitly approving equitable tolling. Coke v. General Board of Adjustment, 640 F . 2d 584, 588 (CA5 1981); Hart v. J . T. Baker Chemical
Co., 598 F. 2d 829, 833 (CA3 1979); Smith v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 10S-109 (CA2 1978).
13
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Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980) on the basis
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of plaintiff's
failure to comply with a related Title VII time provision. Instead, we merely observed in a footnote that "[p]etitioner did
not assert respondent's failure to file the action within 90
days as a defense." 447 U. S., at 811, n. 9.
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as
a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78--1545.

III
In No. 80--951, the union challenges on several grounds the
District Court's authority to award, over the union's
objection, retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass
B. We have already rejected the union's first contention,
namely, the District Court had no jurisdiction to award relief
to those who had not complied with Title VII's filing requirement. The union also contends that in any event there has
been no finding of discrimination with respect to Class B
members and that the predicate for relief under § 706(g) is
therefore missing. This contention is also without merit.
The District Court unquestionably found an unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff class, and the class at that
time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A and B.
Summary judgment ran in favor of the entire class, including
both those members who had filed timely charges and those
who had not. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary
judgment order as well as the finding of a discriminatory employment practice. The court went on, however, to hold
that the District Court had no jurisdiction over claims by
those who had not met the filing requirement and that those
individuals should have been excluded from the class prior to
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the grant of summary judgment. But as we have now held,
that ruling is erroneous. The District Court did have jurisdiction over non-filing class members. Thus, there was no
jurisdictional barrier to its finding of discrimi1;1ation with respect to the entire class. With the reversal of the Court of
Appeals judgment in No. 7&-1545 and our dismissal of No.
7&-1549, which had challenged the affirmance of the summary judgment order, the order that found class-wide
discrimination remains intact and is final. The award of retroactive seniority to members of Subclass B as well as Subclass A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory
employment practice.
Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive
seniority contrary to the collective bargaining agreement
should not be awarded over the objection of a union that has
not itself been found guilty of discrimination. In Franks v.
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) we read the legislative
history of Title VII as giving
"emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole in so far as possible the victims of ...
discrimination .... "
While recognizing that back pay was the only remedy specifically mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that adequate
relief might be denied without a seniority remedy. We concluded that the class-based seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally appropriate under § 706(g).
In Franks, the District Court had found both that the employer had engaged in discrimination and that the discriminatory practices were perpetuated in the collective bargaining
agreements with the unions. 424 U. S., at 751. Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), however, makes it
clear that once there has been a finding of discrimination by
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the employer, an award of retroactive seniority is appropriate even if there is no finding that the union has also illegally
discriminated. In Teamsters, the parties agreed to a decree
which provided that the District Court would decide
"whether any discriminatees should be awarded additional
equitable relief such as retroactive seniority." 431 U. S., at
331, n. 4. Although we held that the union had not violated
Title VII by agreeing to and maintaining the seniority system, we nonetheless directed the union to remain in the litigation as a defendant so that full relief could be awarded the
victims of the employers post-act discrimination. 431 U. S.,
at 356, n. 43. 14 Here, as in Teamsters, the settlement left to
the District Court the final decision as to retroactive
seniority.
In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave
the union all the process that was due it under Title VII in
our cases. The union was allowed to intervene. The District Court heard its objections, made appropriate findings,
and determined that retroactive seniority should be awarded.
The Court of Appeals agreed with that determination, and
we have eliminated from our consideration here the question
whether on the facts of this case the Court of Appeals and the
District Court were in error in this respect.
Accordingly, the judgment in 78-1545 is reversed and the
judgment in 80-951 is affirmed.
So ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS did not participate in consideration or
decision of these cases.
14
In noting that the union in Teamsters properly remained a defendant in
the litigation, we cited to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a). The union in this
case was not joined under Rule 19 when individuals replaced the union as
class representatives, but intervened later. Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA6 1974) (joinder under
Rule 19(a) provides union with full opportunity to participate in the litigation and the formulation of proposed relief, although as practical matter
union not play role in litigation until court finds violation of Title VII).
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JUSTICE POWELL concurring in No. 78-1545 and concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion.
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 1 This was made
1

In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 559
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, however, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans
were met.
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at - - , the District
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final.
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith.
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
2
The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12
ante, at - - and - - ; both references are to terms used by the Evans
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement.
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties,
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of
Franks v. Bowman. 3

3
I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely
filing" issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitivestatus seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the settlementas the Court's judgment does today.
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INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER
80-951
v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
concurring in No. 78-1545 and concurring in the judgment in
No. 80-951.
The above cases arise out of the same protracted controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion.
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion.
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system protected by§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 1 This was made
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 559
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, however, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans
were met.
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at--, the District
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final.
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current employees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed,
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In contrast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith.
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current employees.
2
The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12
ante, at - - and - -; both references are to terms used by the Evans
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement.
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties,
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status seniority under the standard of
Franks v. Bowman. 3

3
I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely
filing'' issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitivestatus seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the settlementas the Court's judgment does today.
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SUMMARY:

Arguments were heard on these consolidated cases on

December 2, 1981.

On January 25 the Court granted petr's motion

for leave to file a suppleme ntal brief (Stevens, J., not participating).

________.,

In that brief, the Court was urged to consider a recent CA 5
.
decision, United States v. Miami, No. 77-1856 which, according to
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petr, impacts on the issue of entering a consent degree over objection

- 2 of a union whose contract rights are adversely affected.
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now also moves for ieave to file a supplemental brief in which it
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v. AT&T.
DISCUSSION:
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There is no response.
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Cases Held for No. 78-1545 and No. 80-951 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines
No. 81-373:

Bridgeport Firefighters v. Association Against
Discrimination

No. 81-374:

City of Bridgeport v. Association Against
Discrimination

Both these cases involve a Title VII suit for discrimination
against minority applicants for firefighter jobs through the use
of a written examination.
CA2 upheld the District Court's
remedial order against an attack, inter alia, that the city could
not be held liable for discriminatory hiring based on the 1971
exam because the last such hirings occurred . on May 2, 1973, and
resps filed their first EEOC charges later than the 300 days
permitted under §706 (e), the timely filing provision applicable
to complaints instituted before a state agency.
The court
explained that the 1971 exam and any hirings based on that exam
were not
isolated
acts of discrimination,
but part of a
continuous policy of discrimination. The district court not only
found a "clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial
discrimination," but also made express findings as to several
discriminatory acts that occurred within 300 days of the filing.
The CA concluded that all of the claims were timely.
'
These cases were held for the possibility that we would
hold Title VII's timely filing requirements to be jurisdictional
or that we would address the continuing violation theory in No.
78-1545.
Because we have held that timely filing is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite
to a Title VII
suit and have
dismissed the writ of certiorari in No. 78-1545 as improvidently
granted, I recommend denying the petitions in these cases.

'
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78-1545

ZIPS v. TWA

80-951

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDENTS v.

TWA

Justice Powell concurring in 78-1545 and concurring
in the judgment in 80-951.

The above cases arise out of the same protracted
controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single
opinion.

The only question in 78-1545 is whether the

timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional
prerequisite in bringing a Title VII suit.
$

I agree that

it is not jurisdictional and i;r subject to waiver

••

~

a~

estoppel.

Accordingly, I join parts I and II of the

Court's opinion.

I join only the judgment in 80-951.

My concern with

the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a
timely charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a
prerequisite to disturbing rights under a bona fide
seniority system protected by Section 703(h), 42
Section 2000 e-2(h).

This was made clear in United

Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
~

u.s.

553, 559 (1977), a case

not cited in the Court's opinion.

I nevertheless concur

~ ~
in the remand of 80-951, ta-.5

~~

u.s.c.

app~;ou~fii

~...... ~.J-

a settlement

'\

~r

,..-""'\

A awarding retroactive competitive- status seniority under
the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 42

· u.s.

747 (1976).
~

This case has been in litigation since 19~), and in

--

3.

view of its complexity it is difficult to be certain as to
"what happened and when".

I believe, however, that one

can conclude that the requirements of Evans were met.

In its order of October 15, 1976, the District Court
found that timely charges had been filed for all class
members.

That order was appealed to the Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit with the appeal of the October 18,
1976, order which found that the defendant had
discriminated against the entire plaintiff class.
Although the October 18th order was affirmed, the Court of
Appeals vacated the October 15th order, holding that the
members of Subclass B had failed to meet the
jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because they had
not filed timely claims.

But the mandate of the Court of

Appeals never issued.

Today, the Court reverses this

aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment.

The October 15,

1976, and October 18, 1976, orders of the District Court,
finding timely charges and discrimination, are now final
and intact.

I therefore concur in the judgment of the

Court affirming the award of retroactive competitivestatus seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman.
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On December 2, the Court heard oral argument in these

consolidated cases.

Petr now moves for leave to file a supplemental

brief after oral argument to apprise the Court of a Dec. 3, 1981
en bane decision by the CA 5, United States v. City of Miami, No. 77-

--.._

1856.

Petr appends a copy of that decision and advises that it

addresses one of the issues of this case:

whether a consent decree

may be entered over the objection of a union whose contract rights
are adversely affected thereby.
DISCUSSION:

The motion is 1n compliance with Rule 35.5 and

\)

should be granted.
There is no response.
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